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ARE  COLLATERAL  CONSEQUENCES  DESERVED?
Brian M. Murray*
While bipartisan passage of the First Step Act and state reforms like it will lead to changes
in sentencing and release practices, they do little to combat the collateral consequences that ex-
offenders face upon release.  Because collateral consequences involve the state’s infliction of seri-
ous harm on those who have been convicted or simply arrested, their existence requires justifica-
tion.  Many scholars classify them as punishment, but modern courts generally diverge, deferring
to legislative labels that classify them as civil, regulatory measures.  This label avoids having to
address existing constitutional and legal constraints on punishment.  This Article argues that
although collateral consequences occur outside of the formal boundaries of the criminal system,
they align with utilitarian, public-safety-based rationales for criminal punishment, such as inca-
pacitation.  Interpreting the nature of collateral consequences, their legislative justifications, and
judicial doctrine confirms that utilitarian terrain underlies the creation and reform of collateral
consequences.  At the same time, these philosophical premises stunt broad reform because public-
safety and risk-prevention rationales inspire only marginal tinkering and do not adequately
respond to the general public’s understanding of desert as crucial to the administration of crimi-
nal justice.  The result is extra punishment run amok and in desperate need of constraints.
This Article suggests a different approach to reforming collateral consequences: subjecting
them to the constraints of retributivism by first asking whether they are deserved.  Retributivist
constraints emphasize dignity and autonomy, blameworthiness, proportionality, and restoration,
and impose obligations and duties on the state, suggesting many collateral consequences are
overly punitive and disruptive of social order.  This mode of analysis aligns with earlier Supreme
Court precedent and accounts for retributivist constraints that already exist in present-day sen-
tencing codes.  Proponents of rolling back collateral consequences should consider how utilizing
desert principles as a constraint on punishment can alleviate the effects of collateral consequences
on ex-offenders.
© 2020 Brian M. Murray.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
The government denies a job application.  Local authorities take away a
driver’s license.  A budding student cannot qualify for a student loan to
attend community college.  A Licensed Practicing Nurse (LPN) loses her
license.  For most defendants, collateral consequences like these are the
harshest sanctions because they limit opportunity, can be timeless, and
inhibit full reentry.1  They feel like punishment because they are enforced or
permitted by the state and restrict liberty and opportunity by virtue of contact
with the criminal justice system.  The fact that many are unknown to criminal
defendants when they plea makes them feel particularly unjust.2  Especially
for low-level offenders, short-term liberty deprivations pale in comparison to
the stigma, restrictions, and lost privileges that result from encountering the
criminal justice system.3
If state-authorized collateral consequences are punishment,4 a position
1 There is a voluminous scholarly literature identifying the range of collateral conse-
quences faced by defendants. E.g., MARGARET LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2018).
Those efforts, as well as some actions by courts, have prompted organizations to attempt to
catalogue the full range of consequences in a national inventory. E.g., State-Specific
Resources, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., http://ccresourcecenter.org/
resources-2/state-specific-resources (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
2 See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV.
670, 671–72 (2008); Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT 15, 17 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002), http://
webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000557_invisible_punishment.pdf.
3 See Joe Palazzolo, 5 Things to Know About Collateral Consequences, WALL ST. J. (May 17,
2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/05/17/5-things-things-to-know-about-collat-
eral-consequences/.
4 This is undeniably a big “if.”  At present, scholars and courts diverge over the legal
status of collateral consequences.  Most scholars classify collateral consequences as punish-
ment.  Courts, however, while recognizing the punishment-like qualities of many collateral
consequences, have attempted to preserve the line between criminal sanctions and civil
regulations. See infra Section I.A.  The case precedent is a case study in tortured interpreta-
tions, causing some to speculate that courts seek to preserve the distinction only as a practi-
cal matter in order to avoid having to apply the entire criminal procedure apparatus to
collateral consequences. See Joshua Kaiser, We Know It When We See It: The Tenuous Line
Between “Direct Punishment” and “Collateral Consequences,” 59 HOW. L.J. 341, 343 (2016).  That
has also led some scholars to delve more deeply into understanding the justification for
collateral consequences if they are conceived as civil, predictive restraint measures regulat-
ing risk. See generally Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301 (2015).  While I offer my definition of punishment later, I recog-
nize that firm resolution of this definitional question is larger than the scope of this Arti-
cle.  I view it as ancillary, and relevant, but not necessary to the argument in this Article,
because even if collateral consequences are not criminal punishment by classification, they
can still be punitive.  This was recently confirmed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.
See U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF PUNISH-
MENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 141, 150 (2019).
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taken by the Supreme Court for nearly a century5 before a change of course,
but possibly on the horizon again after Padilla v. Kentucky6 and other federal
and state cases,7 do some purposes of punishment allow them to expand
more than others?8  And if so, what do we make of that situation in an era of
mass criminalization where collateral consequences enmesh defendants?
There has been no shortage of scholarship highlighting the destructive effect
of collateral consequences on reentry.9  At the same time, the very basis of
punishment in a liberal, democratic order remains in flux and controversial,
causing some to revisit the role of retributivism in justifying or limiting pun-
ishment.10  And while the passage of federal comprehensive criminal justice
reform, known as the First Step Act,11 addresses proper punishment in the
incarceration context, the next step for comprehensive reform is a full-blown
assessment of the collateral consequences that will inevitably affect offenders
after release.
This Article brings these strands of scholarship and reform efforts into
dialogue by addressing the punishment theory basis of collateral conse-
5 See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867) (“[E]xclusion from any
of the professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be
regarded in no other light than as punishment for such conduct.”); Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 286 (1867).
6 559 U.S. 356, 382 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (recognizing how immigration con-
sequences were part and parcel of the criminal case); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret
Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at
21, 22 (“Imposing collateral consequences has become . . . part and parcel of the criminal
case.”); Wayne A. Logan, Challenging the Punitiveness of ‘New Generation’ SORN Laws, 21 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 426, 427 (2018) (referencing SORN laws as a method of social control).
7 See, e.g., People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168, 182 (N.Y. 2018) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment jury trial right applies to criminal offenses where conviction could result in
deportation as punishment).
8 Another way of thinking about this question is like this: the primary justification for
punishment and the purposes it purports to serve have serious consequences for the depth
and breadth of the collateral-consequences regime.
9 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev ed. 2012); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV.
809 (2015); John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013); Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v.
Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87 (2011); Margaret
Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral
Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753 (2011); Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively
Bliss: Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-
Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119 (2009).
10 See Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 1 (2012); Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivism Refined—Or Run Amok?, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 551, 557 (2010) (book review) (discussing affirmative retribution). See generally
Mitchell N. Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism, 32 LAW & PHIL. 83 (2013); Chad Flanders,
How Much Certainty Do We Need to Punish? A Reply to Kolber, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 149;
Adam J. Kolber, Punishment and Moral Risk, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 487.
11 Bonnie Kristian, Trump Signs the Bipartisan First Step Act, WEEK (Dec. 22, 2018),
https://theweek.com/speedreads/814262/trump-signs-bipartisan-first-step-act.
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quences.  It concludes that while their roots are fundamentally utilitarian and
responsive to criminal behavior, they have been labeled otherwise in order to
avoid legal constraints on punishment.  Further, it suggests that current
reform efforts exclusively focus on the wrong question: instead of concentrat-
ing on whether they are useful, contribute to public safety,12 or properly
guard against danger,13 limiting collateral consequences may be easier if
reformers first ask whether they are deserved.
This Article makes no claim as to whether certain collateral conse-
quences, as components of a direct sentence, would be appropriately just
punishment.14  It is possible many would pass that test.  What it does argue,
however, is this: utilitarian purposes of punishment—think public-safety
rationales—more easily allow collateral consequences to proliferate than
retributive principles and, as a result, are less equipped to restrain them.15
Their incapacitative- and deterrence-based rationales, and concerns for wel-
fare maximization, allow for the convenient blurring of the criminal-civil
line.16  Designed to prevent future crime, many collateral consequences are
12 See generally U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 4.
13 This has been the dominant mode of thinking in the wake of the new penology of
the 1990s and the desire to fine tune risk-assessment measures.
14 Commentators have pointed out that the effects of collateral consequences may
actually present more appropriate punishment.  The certificates-of-relief movement argua-
bly impliedly supports this idea by only allowing for the inapplicability of a collateral conse-
quence only after the ex-offender has demonstrated rehabilitation and a need for the
lifting of the restriction.  More recently, Professor Eisha Jain has argued that collateral
consequences should not exist in blanket form and should be subject to scrutiny for their
penal rationales. See Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV.
953, 976 (2018).
15 Of course, there are varieties of retributivism. See John Cottingham, Varieties of Retri-
bution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979) (noting different types of retributive theory exist).
These varieties may be traced to moral or political premises.  For example, retributivists
focused on moral desert tend to fall into pre- and post-Kantian camps. See Peter Koritan-
sky, Two Theories of Retributive Punishment: Immanuel Kant and Thomas Aquinas, 22 HIST. PHIL.
Q. 319, 321 (2005).  Some modern retributivists have sought to develop a theory of retribu-
tion grounded in political obligation and, in particular, cognizant of the demands of the
liberal, democratic order. See generally Markel, supra note 10.
16 For example, at least one commentator has argued that only collateral conse-
quences that advance of the purpose of public safety can be justified. See Milena Tripkovic,
Collateral Consequences of Conviction: Limits and Justifications, CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. &
SOC’Y, Dec. 2017, at 18 (reviewing Gabriel Chin’s suggestion that collateral consequences
meet a public-safety threshold).  But pursuing public safety is not exclusively a regulatory
goal.  Rather, it underlies the theory of incapacitation, which is a traditional purpose for
punishment.  It also might be considered a secondary effect of deterrence and rehabilita-
tive theory.  As such, even if we label civil measures as pursuing that purpose, it actually
reinforces, rather than severs, the underlying roots that are connected to utilitarian theories
of punishment.  Nevertheless, it is not unsurprising that scholars have come to the conclu-
sion that classifying collateral consequences as merely the consequences of criminal behav-
ior, rather than punishment, has useful value. See Hugh LaFollette, Collateral Consequences
of Punishment: Civil Penalties Accompanying Formal Punishment, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 241, 251
(2005).  Similar to the way that Professor Erin Collins has persuasively argued that actuarial
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blunt instruments that may actually inhibit full reentry, ultimately disrupting
the social order aimed to be restored.17  When the primary goals of punish-
ment are safety, security, and minimizing future crime (or predicting danger-
ousness), the temptation to enact collateral consequences is harder to resist
and more difficult to critique.  They are perceived as low-cost interventions
that can heighten public safety through minimizing risk, making them politi-
cally palatable, especially for the risk averse.18  They isolate ex-offenders
beyond what is just and necessary and counterproductively can incentivize
more criminal behavior.  And that is precisely today’s predicament: a perva-
sive network of collateral consequences designed to control human beings
and their relationships with others, all in the name of mitigating risk and
deterring future criminal behavior.19  Many are, in a phrase, undeserved
extra punishment.
That conclusion may provoke a criminal law double-take: are collateral
consequences not the logical outgrowth of the “tough on crime” era that
allowed punitive measures to run amok?  Are they not expressions of societal
disapproval, recognizing past blameworthiness or, at the very least, outlets for
vengeance unaccounted for by the direct sentence itself?  Do they not exact
just deserts for past behavior that connotes a lack of moral trustworthiness on
the part of the offender?  Are they not retributive because they express popu-
lar passions for desert, manifesting hatred, fear, or anger toward offenders?
Some legislators understand them that way—using some strands of retribu-
tive thinking focused on shame and suffering as the starting point for a
response to individual wrongdoing.20  And there is an argument to be made
risk assessment at sentencing represents an “off-label” use, collateral consequences might
be conceived as “off-label” punishment.  Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57
(2018).  Interestingly, a core component of Collins’s article is that “off-label” use can “jus-
tify an increase—rather than a decrease—in our use of incarceration, and in a way that
undermines the fairness and integrity of our criminal justice system.” Id. at 62.
17 The crux of the argument is that collateral consequences are too socially disruptive
and too easily rationalized by utilitarian theories of punishment.
18 See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671, 715–16 (2015).
19 See Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM.
L. 259, 321 (2011); David Garland, The Birth of the Welfare Sanction, 8 BRIT. J.L. & SOC’Y 29,
41–42 (1981); Mayson, supra note 4, at 303; Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction
and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 211–12 (1996) (“Those most willing to blur the
criminal-civil distinction are generally the consequentialists-utilitarians, who do not see
‘doing justice’ as an important value in itself and are happy to ignore desert in favor of a
distribution of sanctions that might more efficiently reduce crime.  As noted, they see
crime and tort as just two similar mechanisms of behavior control through disincentives.”).
One might argue that collateral consequences are the unintended consequence (ironically) of
prioritizing utilitarian theories of punishment in the administration of criminal law.  The
utilitarian theories bled across the criminal-civil line, as low-cost interventions.
20 See Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 96,
100 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (noting how the carceral system,
seemingly justified on familiar penological goals like retribution, is actually about separa-
tion through incapacitation during and after prison); Dolovich, supra note 19, at 265 (not-
ing how individualist strains of political thought infuse penological language to justify
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that some legislators thought as much during the rise of collateral conse-
quences after the 1970s, which occurred at the same time as significant
increases in the severity of punishment overall.21  After all, some have said of
an ex-offender seeking employment or a college education: Does she really
deserve it?22
But that story confuses potential justifications with distributive principles
of punishment, shortchanging the value of retributivism to reform efforts
and misrepresenting retributivism for revenge.  Retributivism, whether
understood as grounded in moral or political-legal desert,23 seeks only to
properly restore the social order disrupted by the will of the criminal, care-
fully calibrating for proportionality and blameworthiness.  It rejects using the
guilty, and especially the innocent, to intentionally further other objectives.24
Many collateral consequences undercut retribution’s inherently restorative
harsh punishment).  As I read Dolovich, this point underscores how the conflating of lan-
guage traditionally associated with retribution has been coopted to justify incapacitation.
See id. at 270–71 (noting how the form of punishment does not seem consistent with the
retributive principles that are mindful of severity and proportionality); id. at 286 (“The
discourse of personal choice and individual agency that dominates public and political
thinking about crime and punishment justifies and thereby sustains the project of perpet-
ual marginalization and exclusion.”).
21 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 816–17 (2006) (noting how sentencing regimes grew increasingly severe in the last
three decades of the twentieth century); Michael Tonry, Punishment and Human Dignity:
Sentencing Principles for Twenty-First-Century America, 47 CRIME & JUST. 119, 123 (2018) (dis-
cussing disjunction between retributive literature in the 1970s, which called for restraint,
fairness, and equality in sentencing, with harsh punishment regimes that led to upticks in
incarceration rates).
22 See Jonathan Simon, Positively Punitive: How the Inventor of Scientific Criminology Who
Died at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century Continues to Haunt American Crime Control at the
Beginning of the Twenty-First, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2135, 2135–36 (2006) (“Rhetoric consistent
with retribution and other expressive themes in penality, combined with the dramatic
repudiation of the rhetoric of rehabilitation by many of those who had long supported it,
has covered over the enduring role of positivist criminology as a source domain for Ameri-
can penal law throughout the twentieth century and into the beginning of the twenty-first.”
(footnote omitted)).
23 It is crucial to the argument in this Article that a distinction be made between types
of retributive theories. See infra Part III.  The latter might be called Kantian retribution.
Most modern criticism of retribution is directed at Kant’s theory of punishment.  However,
retribution has a longer history than that.  Retributive justice links back to ancient Greek
and Judeo-Christian thought, from Aristotle to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in the Mid-
dle Ages. See generally; PLATO, THE LAWS 241 (A.E. Taylor trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1960);
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE (F.H. Peters trans., Kegan Paul, Trench, Tru¨bner
& Co. 10th ed. 1906); Matthew A. Pauley, The Jurisprudence of Crime and Punishment from
Plato to Hegel, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1994); Koritansky, supra note 15.  This understanding of
retribution, which Kant reacted to, contains more moderating components that modern-day
critics of Kantian retribution do not usually account for when criticizing the theory overall.
24 Of course, most retributive theories recognize how punishment can secondarily pur-
sue other, more traditionally utilitarian ends, like public safety.
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nature by redisrupting what had been restored.25  Retributivism has built in
safeguards by accounting for degrees of blameworthiness, treading cautiously
around using human beings as examples for others, limiting punishment due
to proportionality concerns, leaving room for mercy and recognizing
humility, and asserting positive duties—for the state and fellow citizens—to
refrain from perpetually enforcing collateral consequences and uncalled-for
stigma.  A retributive focus could surprisingly result in less room for a harsh
system of collateral consequences.26
This Article advances this critique in three parts.  Part I explains the his-
tory, purpose, and scope of collateral consequences, paying particular atten-
tion to the theoretical confusion about their punishment-like roots.  It notes
that while collateral consequences are not currently labeled criminal punish-
ment by modern legislatures or courts, they are fundamentally akin to pun-
ishment, and were even recognized as such by earlier courts.27  Deference to
modern labeling has laid the seeds for an expansive regime of extra punish-
ment justified by the functional demands of the criminal justice system.
Part II interprets the collateral-consequences regime to demonstrate
how their origin, history, and purpose align with concerns about safety and
security, and the philosophical presuppositions upon which many are based
resemble the inner workings of utilitarian theories.  In particular, the aim of
many is to incapacitate and to deter.  That contributes to their classification
by courts as civil restraints rather than punishment: as engines for controlling
risk, they sometimes do not appear to be enacted in response to blamewor-
thiness.28  But legislatures create them in response to social harm dealt with
25 Joshua Kleinfeld argues similarly about “reconstructivism,” which he characterizes
as a social theory of punishment that is distinct from modern forms of retributivism.  I will
discuss its relationship to retributivism in Part III. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism:
The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1524 (2016).
26 Another way to think about the argument is as if the purposes exist along a spec-
trum, with retribution being the furthest from collateral consequences, followed by reha-
bilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.  That last category has more recently been
rebranded the regulation of future risk—or dangerousness—in an effort to reinforce the
criminal-civil distinction.  But its roots remain in the same place: utilitarian purposes of
punishment.  The rebranding seems like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, which scholars are now
pointing out in the context of the actuarial risk assessment movement. See Collins, supra
note 16, at 72–77 (assessing the normative merits of applying actuarial risk assessment
during sentencing).
27 Notably, the first Supreme Court cases on the question of whether collateral conse-
quences were punishment squarely answered in the affirmative. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867) (“[E]xclusion from any of the professions or any of the
ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light than as
punishment for such conduct.”); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 286 (1867).
28 Judicial and legislative classification of collateral consequences as civil has contrib-
uted to confusion, making the focus about whether a certain consequence fits into a label-
ing dichotomy rather than whether it is fundamentally punitive. See generally John Kip
Cornwell, The Quasi-Criminality Revolution, 85 UMKC L. REV. 311 (2017) (discussing the
features of quasi-criminal proceedings impacting liberty and their outgrowth from a cul-
ture of control).
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by the criminal system, a position initially and correctly acknowledged by the
Supreme Court,29 only to be modified in the midst of the criminal procedure
revolution when retaining such a definition would lead to serious practical
concerns for the administration of justice.30  In short, they are harms suf-
fered by offenders by virtue of their contact with the criminal system and
designed to curtail future activity by such ex-offenders.  Their prevalence sug-
gests they are in desperate need of restraint.
Part III reframes the reform question, and asks whether evaluating the
collateral-consequences regime with retributivist premises can help reform-
ers.  Its intention is to begin a conversation and recognizes that while there is
no single retributivist theory, basic retributive premises shared by most theo-
ries could operate as constraints on collateral consequences beyond what is
currently thought possible.31  Part III suggests the built-in components of
retributive theories—whether fundamentally focused on moral or legal-polit-
ical desert—would view existing collateral-consequences policy with skepti-
cism.  Retributive concepts relating to blameworthiness, proportionality,
restoration, and affirmative duties on the part of the state and community
undercut the logic of many collateral consequences in their current form.
In laying the groundwork for a deeper retributive accounting of collat-
eral consequences,32 the takeaway is this: reformers—especially in a moment
when criminal justice reform is popular across the political spectrum—need
to consider how retributive considerations are tools that can help.  This line
of thinking exists in earlier Supreme Court precedent that has no qualms
about labeling collateral consequences punishment and builds on existing
sentencing codes that aim to account for desert and the Model Penal Code
that prioritizes it.33  It also responds to the general public’s desire to respond
29 Courts were thus open to the idea that collateral consequences were subject to
retributive constraints given their punitive roots.
30 This synergizes with the Stuntzian thesis that the criminal procedure revolution
announced by the Court may have had unintentional consequences on legislative behav-
ior. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 21, at 816–17 (noting how sentencing regimes grew
increasingly severe in the last three decades of the twentieth century).
31 Of course, a comprehensive analysis of this point requires much more than occurs
here because the depth and breadth of collateral consequences is vast.  The primary objec-
tive here is to bring discussions about justifications and purposes for punishment into dia-
logue with the pervasive network of collateral consequences, and to note how reviving the
constraints within retributivism might limit an ever-growing collateral-consequences
apparatus.
32 This in-depth retributive accounting, which occurs in my companion paper titled
Retributivist Reform of Collateral Consequences, suggests that retributivism can constrain the
prevailing collateral-consequences regime, and that its components could reduce inequi-
ties stemming from the pervasive network of collateral effects resulting from contact with
the criminal system.  In particular, the article argues that retributivism as a constraint has
significant implications for legislative reform, prosecutorial discretion, pre- and post-trial
procedure, and remedies.
33 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & TYLER SCOT WILLIAMS, MAPPING AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 8
(2018).  The goal here is a punishment theory accounting of the roots of the existing
collateral-consequences regime; and second, a pivot to how retributive theories might view
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to criminal justice questions in a fashion that is cognizant of desert.  This
approach could supplement recent reform efforts that have exclusively
argued for precise tailoring based on calculated risk-prevention tools.34
Whereas incarceration or other direct sentences attempt to already account
for desert, collateral consequences may be undeserved punishment that per-
petuate mass criminalization.35
I. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF COLLATERAL SANCTIONS
There is a growing scholarly consensus that collateral consequences are
punishment because they result in the loss of tangible rights that affect citi-
zenship, resulting in a change in status based on a judgment about the
offender’s moral responsibility.36  But what constitutes criminal punishment
is a matter of controversy.  Courts have not followed scholars in this regard,
equivocating on whether collateral consequences are restraints, punitive disa-
bilities, or real, criminal punishments.37  Instead, they have been labeled reg-
ulatory, “civil,” measures in many contexts.38  This Part discusses the history
behind collateral consequences, the motivations behind their legislative
enactment, and how courts and scholars have understood them.  It lays the
groundwork for interpreting the relationship between collateral conse-
quences and punishment theories, demonstrating connections between col-
lateral consequences and all of the typical rationales for punishment.
The number of collateral consequences across federal and state jurisdic-
tions is astounding.  With estimates in the tens of thousands,39 they come in a
that regime given renewed interest in retributivism as a constraint on punishment over the
past several years.  This analysis occurs against the backdrop of realities within the Ameri-
can criminal justice system and mindful of the Supreme Court’s changing understanding
of collateral consequences.  While the question of whether retribution or some other justi-
fication for punishment should be primary is beyond the scope of this Article, my position
is that retribution is what makes punishment distinctive, and thereby relevant for assessing
collateral consequences.
34 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 135; Mayson, supra note 4, at 347
(arguing for reform on risk-prevention grounds).
35 I neither claim that retribution can never justify what currently exist as collateral
consequences nor that there might not be secondary aims of punishment that allow collat-
eral consequences.  Rather, the claim is purely one of degree: that along the spectrum of
punishment theory, retributive purposes are most likely to constrain collateral
consequences.
36 See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1791–93 (2012); Travis, supra note 2, at 15 (recogniz-
ing collateral consequences as punishment because they result in the “diminution of the
rights and privileges of citizenship and legal residency”).
37 See Chin, supra note 36, at 1792.
38 See Tripkovic, supra note 16, at 18 (“The legal stance taken in the United States is
that collateral consequences are not punishment, but constitute regulatory
measures . . . .”).
39 See Collateral Consequences Inventory, NAT’L INVENTORY COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
CONVICTION, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/results/?jurisdiction=&conse
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variety of forms and touch every aspect of life.40  They can deprive individu-
als of civil rights and privileges related to citizenship (such as voting), impact
areas of property or family law (such as custody of children41 or housing42),
affect eligibility for public benefits43 (such as housing or medical assistance),
impair the ability to obtain a license, and inhibit employment.  Some are
automatic and others, while potential, are enforced by both public and pri-
vate actors.44  Their duration can be for a lifetime.45
But where did they come from?  American jurisdictions have built on a
history that predates American law.  Interestingly, there was a time when
commentators thought that collateral consequences were a thing of the past.
In 1983, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Legal Status of Prisoners
announced that the “era of collateral consequences was drawing to a close.”46
The thought was that the number of consequences would diminish and that
those that remained would be more rational and narrowly tailored.47
Instead, the number of consequences exploded.
Collateral consequences are the logical outgrowth of historical measures
that were associated with criminal activity and conceived as punishment.
quence_category=&narrow_category=&triggering_offense_category=&consequence_type=
&duration_category=&page_number=1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
40 Chin & Love, supra note 6, at 27 (“Based on conviction of a serious crime, a person
loses civil rights, including political, property, and family rights, temporarily or
permanently.”).
41 See 55 PA. CODE § 3041.189(a)(1) (2019).
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2012); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-167(b)
(West 2019) (detailing the impact of a final criminal conviction in a drug-related offense
on eviction proceedings).
43 See, e.g., 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(g) (West 2019); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 862a(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(4), (b)(3); 43 STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 871(b) (West 2019) (noting the implications of false representations in acquiring unem-
ployment benefits); 62 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 432(9) (West 2019).
44 Admittedly, some collateral consequences are inflicted entirely by private actors,
with or without permission from the law.  Some are purely social.  The further a conse-
quence from state enforcement, the harder it is to classify it as punishment.
45 See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225.503(a) (West 2019), invalidated
by Nixon v. Commonwealth, 839 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. 2003).  Though invalidated, the law has
not been amended and enforcement remains subject to the priorities of state agencies.
Under the Pennsylvania Older Adults Protective Services Act  (OAPSA), nursing homes,
home health care agencies, and other workers in long-term care facilities could not have
any theft convictions at any time. See 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10225.103 (West
2019) (defining “[f]acility” as including the following: a “domiciliary care home,” a “home
health care agency,” a “long-term care nursing facility,” an “older adult daily living center,”
and a “personal care home”).
46 Chin & Love, supra note 6, at 30.
47 Id. (“[T]he ABA . . . predicted . . . : ‘[a]s the number of disabilities diminishes and
their imposition becomes more rationally based and restricted in coverage, the need for
expungement and nullification statutes decreases.”  (second alteration in original) (quot-
ing AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS § 23-
8.2, cmt. (1983))).
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Greek infamy, outlawry, and Anglo “civil death” are their antecedents.48  In
those historical moments, stigma was enshrined in law through the loss of
certain privileges after conviction.49  A clear legal line was drawn between the
noncriminal and criminal classes by controlling offenders through the loss of
status under the law, foreshadowing modern-day, postincarceration
incapacitation.
American courts picked up fairly soon after the nation’s founding, with
some referring to “disabilities . . . imposed upon the convict” as “part of the
punishment,”50 allowing convicted individuals to be “regarded as dead in
law.”51  Loss of status was recognized at common law and as part of some
statutory law.52  American jurisdictions also initially allowed attainder before
the Constitution regulated it.53  As such, this resulting change in status was
somewhat of an inherited trait associated with the administration of the crim-
inal justice system, although American jurisdictions classified measures as
part of the civil system.54
Legislative enactment of collateral consequences ramped up in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century.  Interestingly, they increased rapidly dur-
ing the “tough on crime” era that came in the wake of a penal system focused
on rehabilitation.55  This suggests these measures may have been designed to
respond to sentencing trends viewed unfavorably by political actors: collat-
eral consequences could achieve the punishment put on the back burner by
rehabilitation.56  There were broad disqualifications from social benefits, sig-
nificant immigration consequences, and the rapid onset of sex-offender
48 Id. at 27; see also Alessandro Corda, The Collateral Consequence Conundrum: Compara-
tive Genealogy, Current Trends, and Future Scenarios, 77 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 69, 72–73
(2019) (describing Greco, Roman, and German approaches to collateral consequences).
49 CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW 37 (Thomas S.
Bell trans., 1916) (noting how infamy under Roman criminal law was formal punishment).
50 See, e.g., Sutton v. McIlhany, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 235, 236 (C.P. Huron County
1848); see also Margaret Colgate Love, Essay, The Collateral Consequences of Padilla v. Ken-
tucky: Is Forgiveness Now Constitutionally Required?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 113, 114
(2011) (“While conventionally labeled as ‘civil,’ collateral consequences are increasingly
understood and experienced as criminal punishment, and never-ending punishment at
that.”).
51 Avery v. Everett, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (N.Y. 1888) (quoting 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTI-
CAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *725 (Springfield, G. & C. Merriam 1836)).
52 See generally Chin, supra note 36, at 1790 (comparing collateral consequences, and
the change in legal status that they bring to ex-offenders, to de jure civil death regimes
from the past).
53 Corda, supra note 48, at 73.
54 See id. at 76 (noting how American lawmakers chose to classify collateral conse-
quences as nonpunishment despite ancient classifications that leaned toward defining
them as such).
55 Mayson, supra note 4, at 307.
56 In other words, collateral consequences increased as harsh sentences were replaced
by rehabilitative priorities.
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registration laws.57  As such, collateral consequences are sometimes associ-
ated with retributive theories of punishment, and there is evidence that
lawmakers enacting such measures considered them partially retributive in
the sense that they were condemnatory.58  But as will be shown below, their
nature more closely resembles incapacitative measures, born from utilitarian
logic about preventing risky individuals from committing future crimes.59
Courts have utilized nonretributive theories to justify classifying collat-
eral consequences as regulatory rather than wholly punitive.60  While courts
have acknowledged the harsh effect of collateral consequences, most courts
have classified collateral consequences as something other than punishment,
and certainly not criminal punishment.  Scholars have not been as equivocal,
57 See Logan, supra note 6, at 427 (referencing SORN laws as a method of social con-
trol); see, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, 108 Stat. 2038
(1994), superseded by Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. 109-248, tit. I,
120 Stat. 590 (2006).
58 Dolovich, supra note 20, at 100.
59 See id. at 97 (describing American carceral system as embracing an approach
focused on “permanent exclusion”).  Indeed, collateral-consequences regimes expanded
significantly around the same time as the actuarial risk tools were integrated into correc-
tions. See Collins, supra note 16, at 58.  Therefore, the rise of collateral consequences
might be understood in a few ways: as a covert, retributive reaction to utilitarian emphases
in criminal punishment, pursued by legislatures trying to account for both retributive and
utilitarian justifications, or as the logical extension of those utilitarian emphases resulting
in full-blown incapacitation, but placed within the civil system by legislatures to avoid
extensive scrutiny.  Dolovich, supra note 20, at 97 (“[T]hose fortunates who are released
will face a host of state-imposed obstacles making it extremely difficult for them to con-
struct stable and law-abiding lives on the outside.”).  Regardless of which historical legal
explanation is correct, the core claim of this Article remains. See also Simon, supra note 22,
at 2137–38, 2138 n.22 (noting incapacitation as the basis behind several legislative
enactments).
60 See Mayson, supra note 4, at 311 (“Governments defending this kind of challenge
typically assert that the measure at issue is not punishment at all, but rather a regulatory
measure with a non-punitive aim—sex offender registration laws, to protect the commu-
nity; voter disenfranchisement provisions, to protect the integrity of the franchise; immi-
gration consequences, to ‘protect[ ] the public from dangerous criminal aliens’ and limit
residence to people of good character; bars to government benefits, to prevent fraud and
allocate scarce resources to the most deserving.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Demore v.
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 515 (2003)) (first citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 94, 105 (2003); then
citing Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978); then citing Demore, 538
U.S. at 515; then citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); then citing
Hinds v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 259, 267–68 (1st Cir. 2015) (concluding that removal on basis of
conviction is not punishment); and then citing Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419, 428–31
(7th Cir. 2000)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 13 28-FEB-20 11:30
2020] are  collateral  consequences  deserved? 1043
resting fairly comfortably for the past several decades on the idea that such
consequences amount to punishment.61
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the range of consequences asso-
ciated with a conviction for several decades at this point, suggesting that
imposing such consequences is within the interests of the state.62  The Court
has also said that the Constitution’s prohibition of bills of attainder implies
consideration of collateral consequences as punitive.63  Other pronounce-
ments by the Court have suggested similar thinking,64 including justifying
the extension of the right to counsel, although the Court stopped short of
declaring deportation a criminal punishment in Padilla v. Kentucky.65  While
the Court has defined punishment as a deprivation in response to past con-
duct,66 its recent precedent has been less than clear in drawing lines and now
almost certainly leads to classifying collateral consequences as civil, nonpuni-
tive, regulatory measures.67
Originally, the Court was willing to consider the substantive effects of
laws when determining if they were punitive.68  In fact, the Court had no
qualms labeling collateral consequences as extra punishment prior to Trop v.
61 See id. at 314 (noting how scholars and commentators “have uniformly argued that
CCs are punishment, and that the courts have erred in finding otherwise”).
62 See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 247 n.1 (1971) (per curiam) (“A convicted
criminal may be disenfranchised, lose the right to hold federal or state office, be barred
from entering certain professions, be subject to impeachment when testifying as a witness,
be disqualified from serving as a juror, and may be subject to divorce.” (citations omit-
ted)); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946) (acknowledging the “loss of substan-
tial rights”); see also Chin, supra note 36, at 1822–23 (citing Daniels v. United States, 532
U.S. 374, 379 (2001)).
63 See Chin, supra note 36, at 1816 (citing Johnson v. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377,
380–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d mem. sub nom. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974)).
64 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (recognizing opprobrium and stigma);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (denying marital rights to inmates is a “punish-
ment for crime”).
65 For example, Justice Powell noted the fact of collateral consequences when the
Court extended the right to counsel beyond felony charges. See Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 48 n.11 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Chin, supra note 36, at 1826.
Of course, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 382 (2010), considered deportation as part
and parcel of the criminal case.
66 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867) (“[E]xclusion from any of the
professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no
other light than as punishment for such conduct.”); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 286 (1867).
67 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones &
One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189
(1898).
68 See Kaiser, supra note 4, at 355–56 (referencing how, in United States v. One Assort-
ment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984), the Court did not look at “substantive effects” at
all).  Also, the Supreme Court has considered collateral consequences when conducting
proportionality analysis.  Julia L. Torti, Accounting for Punishment in Proportionality Review, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1940 (2013) (“[T]he punishment cadena temporal in Weems included a
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Dulles,69 when the Court had no problem trafficking in effects.70  But
recently the Court has leaned heavily on the intent behind laws that create
collateral consequences.71  Only deprivations connected to retribution or
deterrence that were intended by the legislature would be labeled criminal
punishment.72  A line of cases grafted considerations onto considerations,73
with legislative labeling front and center, thereby tautologically blurring the
definition of punishment.74  This culminated in Smith v. Doe,75 where the
Court held that only if “the statutory scheme is ‘so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil’” will the Court
consider classifying the statute as a punitive measure.76  Now courts are
tasked with a two-part inquiry that prioritizes labeling but allows for consider-
permanent loss of political and civil rights.”); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274
(1980) (referencing “‘accessories’ included within the punishment”).
69 356 U.S. at 96 (plurality opinion).
70 See Kaiser, supra note 4, at 350 (“Prior to Trop, actually, the Court had explicitly
considered the actual effects of a statute in question rather than delving into issues of
legislative intent.”).
71 See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring, 409 U.S. at 235 (holding that statu-
tory label of “civil” exempted law from constitutional protections relating to punishment);
Trop, 356 U.S. at 96 (plurality opinion) (“In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this
Court has generally based its determination upon the purpose of the statute.”).
72 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 96 (plurality opinion) (“In deciding whether or not a law is
penal, this Court has generally based its determination upon the purpose of the statute.  If
the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment—that is, to reprimand the
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.—it has been considered penal.  But a statute has been
considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other
legitimate governmental purpose.” (footnotes omitted)); Kaiser, supra note 4, at 358–59.
Interestingly, the Court seems to restrict the punishment label to those consequences
related to retribution and deterrence.  So the Court interestingly has labeled nonretribu-
tive collateral consequences “civil” and not punishment.  Noticeably, the Court seems to
disregard the idea that an incapacitative purpose could resemble punishment.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270–71 (1996); United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989); One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354; United States
v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring, 409 U.S. 232; Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (listing factors relating to statutory
disabilities or restraints, the history of the restrictions, how they relate to the goals of pun-
ishment, and if they are excessive); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
74 See Kaiser, supra note 4, at 354–55 (detailing how the Supreme Court, over the past
century, has leaned too heavily on legislative labeling and confused definitions with justifi-
cations for punishment, thereby resulting in a test that renders it nearly impossible for a
collateral consequence to be labeled punishment).
75 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
76 Id. at 92 (alteration in original) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361); see
Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences and the Perils of Categorical Ambiguity, in LAW AS PUNISH-
MENT / LAW AS REGULATION 77, 91 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011) (“Trop’s view of collateral
consequences remains the consensus among American courts (though not without
exception).”).
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ation of effects.77  This has amounted to a rule without teeth, as legislative
labeling has ruled the day, rather than the substance of the deprivation.
The hesitation on the part of courts to recognize collateral conse-
quences as criminal punishment is likely due in part to the fact that it would
have direct consequences for several aspects of the administration of justice.
The right to counsel, due process of law, the Ex Post Facto Clause,78 and
other substantive and procedural rights would immediately be implicated,
thereby requiring courts to develop another set of doctrines.79  More bluntly,
classifying collateral consequences as criminal punishment would result in
serious practical challenges in the administration of the criminal justice sys-
tem because it would force courts to critically assess plea-bargaining doctrines
and the responsibilities of the parties involved.80  A similar thread runs
through Padilla; when considering the consequence of deportation, the
Court did not label it punishment.81  Instead, it opted for recognition of how
the consequence was intimately associated with the criminal justice system.82
Notably, that suggests the consequence could be punishment, even if it not
formally labeled criminal punishment.
The practical result has been the classification of most collateral conse-
quences as regulatory measures.83  Despite multiple opportunities, the post-
77 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (“‘[O]nly the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legisla-
tive intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal pen-
alty.” (citations omitted) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997))).
78 See Logan, supra note 6, at 429 (“[A]n important shift has occurred in the views of
state and lower federal courts, which have increasingly found fault with ‘new-generation’
SORN laws . . . .”).  Notably, state courts and federal courts are coming to different conclu-
sions about SORN laws even when the ex post facto provisions in the state constitutions at
issue are similar to the U.S. Constitution.
79 See Corda, supra note 48, at 81 (noting the fiction perpetuated by courts that labels
collateral consequences civil regulations in order to avoid constitutional constraints on
punishment); Ewald, supra note 76, at 92 (“If defined as punishment, a penalty imposed
on people convicted before that restriction was enacted may violate the Ex Post Facto
[C]lause . . . .  Moreover, a defendant must be made aware of all criminal penalties to
which he is subject before he can plead guilty . . . .”); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Crimi-
nal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 698–99 (1999) (“The fact is . . . the Court is
no longer trying to define punishment, . . . but is instead giving the government free reign
to circumvent constitutional criminal procedure altogether.”).
80 See Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences, 12 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 213, 229–37 (2016) (discussing how conceiving of collateral consequences as
punishment would require an assessment of prosecutorial disclosure obligations under the
logic of Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)); Roberts, supra
note 2, at 672 (“By strictly circumscribing the category of direct consequences, courts pro-
mote finality and efficiency in the plea bargain process.”).
81 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365.
82 See id. at 365.  Kaiser notes how the definition-of-punishment doctrine was on
“unstable ground” prior to Padilla.  Kaiser, supra note 4, at 366.
83 See Tripkovic, supra note 16, at 18 (“The legal stance taken in the United States is
that collateral consequences are not punishment, but constitute regulatory
measures . . . .”).
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1950s Supreme Court and lower federal courts have refrained from labeling
many collateral consequences equivalent to criminal punishment.84  And
other courts have followed suit, concluding that collateral consequences are
meant to manage public welfare.85  The Bureau of Justice Assistance within
the Department of Justice did the same when describing the Denial of Fed-
eral Benefits program as designed to prevent crime.86  And the federal gov-
ernment delegated pursuit of this purpose when it allowed states to
administer components of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which controlled the provision of cash assis-
tance and food stamps.87  Courts understand collateral consequences as
measures to “‘protect society from the [ex-offender’s] corrupting influence,’
and to prevent the commission of future offenses by ex-offenders.”88
One area that seems to be changing slightly involves sexual-offender
registration laws.  Conceived as risk-assessment measures that would allow for
tracking dangerous offenders, they were initially upheld by the Supreme
Court and lower courts on those grounds.89  But some recent decisions at the
state and federal level have emphasized the punitive nature of these restric-
tions, analogizing them to forms of historical banishment and shaming pun-
ishments.90  Furthermore, the actual administrative regime that supports sex-
offender laws was considered similar to probation and parole supervision,
which are traditionally considered associated with criminal punishment.
Despite judicial classification in one direction, scholars have tended to
go the other way.  There has been extensive discussion of collateral conse-
quences for several decades, recognizing the punishment-like qualities of
84 See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 95–96 (1997); United States v. Ursery,
518 U.S. 267, 297 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The Court did, however, clarify that
framing punishment discussions in terms of “criminal” and “civil” labels was not entirely
useful.  United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1989) (“The notion of punishment,
as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal
law . . . .”).  Other federal courts have refrained from labeling sex-offender registration and
other collateral consequences, such as disenfranchisement or employment restrictions, as
punishment. See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 158–60 (1960) (plurality opinion)
(employment disqualification); United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) (sex-
offender registration requirement); United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 627 n.4 (6th Cir.
2012) (same); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 2010) (felon
disenfranchisement).
85 See Ewald, supra note 76, at 78 (“[M]any jurists and some commentators conclude
that collateral sanctions are fundamentally regulatory: meant to ration scarce resources or
ensure that only certain citizens are eligible for a given profession . . . .”).
86 Id. at 113 n.41.
87 Id. at 86.
88 Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sen-
tencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 161 (1999) (alteration in original) (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REV. 403, 406 (1967)).
89 Parks, 698 F.3d at 6.
90 See Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016); Millard v. Rankin, 265 F.
Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017).
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these measures.91  Professor Alec Ewald considers them punishment given
that their “purpose, effect, public meaning, [and] mode of administration”
are punitive.92  Professor Joshua Kleinfeld links them to the concept of ban-
ishment, and argues that formal classifications belie reality.93  Scholars have
emphasized how collateral consequences institute a legal status comparable
to “civil death.”94
Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court has failed to rigor-
ously apply its own doctrine, thereby resulting in mistaken classifications.  For
example, following Doe, scholars complained that the Court did not utilize
the “effects” portion of the doctrine to zero in on the punitive nature of sex-
offender registration requirements.95  Numerous scholars make the same
arguments for a range of collateral consequences.96  Further, older Supreme
Court precedent—such as Weems v. United States,97 Cummings v. Missouri,98
and Ex parte Garland99—acknowledges the punitive nature of such conse-
quences, even if not formally labeled criminal punishment.
The gist of the scholarly argument comes down to the following princi-
ples about collateral consequences: (1) they result from a conviction, which
involves a judgment of culpability about social harm; (2) they are imposed by
the state (especially automatic ones); (3) they inflict suffering or deprive for-
mer offenders of some good; and (4) most former offenders would prefer
them to be lifted.100  In other words, collateral consequences are punish-
ment because they result in suffering inflicted by the state, in response to
wrongdoing, against the will of the offender.  These realities led scholars to
conclude that even if, given blurred justifications, collateral consequences
cannot formally be labeled criminal “punishment,” taken as a whole they are
punishment-like.101  Scholars have persuaded the American Bar Association
91 See supra note 4.
92 Ewald, supra note 76, at 97.
93 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 965–69
(2016).
94 See Chin, supra note 36; Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Crimi-
nal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1060–61.
95 See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Populism and Punishment: Sex Offender Registration and Com-
munity Notification in the Courts, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 37, 38–39; Andrea E. Yang,
Comment, Historical Criminal Punishments, Punitive Aims and Un-“Civil” Post-Custody Sanctions
on Sex Offenders: Reviving the Ex Post Facto Clause as a Bulwark of Personal Security and Private
Rights, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1299, 1301–03 (2007).
96 Mayson, supra note 4, at 310, 314; see also supra note 73.
97 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (describing, in detail, “the perpetual limitation on his liberty”
that the criminal endures after finally finishing his sentence).
98 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867) (“The disabilities created by the constitution of
Missouri . . . constitute punishment.”).
99 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 340 (1867) (stating that, in preventing a convicted—but
pardoned—criminal from holding office, “Congress [is trying] to punish” the criminal).
100 Interestingly, the attributes are shared by many punishment theorists who justify
punishment on different grounds, ranging from Thomas Aquinas to H.L.A Hart to Her-
bert Packer, as well as contemporary theorists.
101 See Chin, supra note 36, at 1832; Murray, supra note 80, at 223.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-FEB-20 11:30
1048 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
(ABA) and American Law Institute (ALI), which have suggested that sentenc-
ing courts consider them as part of the punishment for an offense.102  Certifi-
cates of relief seemingly imply this as well, aiming to lift sanctions otherwise
automatically imposed by virtue of conviction.
The contemporary scholarly consensus classifying collateral conse-
quences as punishment is not without its critics and theoretical confusion
remains.  The reason stems from the complexity of collateral-consequences
regimes themselves: some consequences seem to be imposed due to the cul-
pability of defendants and in order to inflict harm, making them condemna-
tory.103  Others seem to be entirely about preventing future behavior by
those otherwise judged to be risky, which is a premise shared by “civil” regula-
tions.104  The latter is especially confusing in the case of arrests resulting in
collateral consequences.  The distinction between automatic and potential
collateral consequences creates similar confusion as the actor inflicting harm
is less clear.105  The Supreme Court signaled this confusion when it empha-
sized the nonretributive components of collateral consequences as indicative
of why they were not to be viewed as punitive.106  But that also infused more
confusion as it conflated the definitions of punitive and retributive.  In other
words, the Court has simultaneously adopted these positions: (1) that if a
nonpunitive purpose exists, the Court will not label the measure punish-
ment; and (2) the Constitution does not mandate any one penal justification,
thereby implying more than one can exist.107  Thus, collateral consequences
exist along a legal spectrum and the reason for their existence is not uni-
form, something Padilla intimated but did not explicitly declare.  Any overlap
102 See Introduction to MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, at xxi (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2014).
103 See ZACHARY HOSKINS, BEYOND PUNISHMENT?: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE COLLAT-
ERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 45 (2019) (describing condemnation as a crucial com-
ponent of the meaning of punishment).
104 See LaFollette, supra note 16, at 243 (noting three ways to classify collateral conse-
quences: (1) as punishment in all “relevant respects”; (2) not punishment but direct conse-
quences of criminal behavior; and (3) measures designed to protect citizens from risks
posed by ex-offenders).
105 See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 93, at 969 (describing confusion relating to the pub-
lic-private distinction).
106 See Kaiser, supra note 4, at 358.  Kaiser makes a point that the Court restricted the
punishment label to those consequences related to retribution. Id.  So the Court interest-
ingly has labeled nonretributive collateral consequences “civil” and not punishment.  My
argument is that this is incorrect, but entirely foreseeable: retribution justifies them the
least; utilitarian theories justify them more, but allow them to seem nonpunitive and
merely regulatory given that utilitarian calculations also underlie traditionally civil
measures.
107 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion); United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989).
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in purposes reflects the elusive relationship between retributive and utilita-
rian theories that has confounded scholars before.108
The confusion in this debate arises from conflation of the definition of
what punishment is and what its purposes might be, the Court’s decision to
emphasize legislative classification above other considerations, and the fact
that utilitarian purposes for punishment closely resemble utilitarian purposes
for what has been classified as civil regulation.  Hence, collateral conse-
quences might exist along a spectrum of penal purposes relating to both
retributive and utilitarian theories, and a spectrum of utilitarian regulatory
purposes.109  Even the most fervent and loyal punishment theorists have con-
ceded that there can be primary and secondary aims of punishment.110
For example, an evaluation of sex-offender registration regimes illus-
trates the point.  Ask a layperson, and she might say that a convicted sex
offender “deserves” to be labeled for his entire life as a predator (retribu-
tion).  Ask someone else, and he might reply that the label is purely instru-
mental, designed to put the public on notice of that individual’s propensity
for risky behavior and prevent the individual from acting on it (communica-
tion and incapacitation).111  Ask a third person and the conclusion might be
that the label operates to deter future offenders, minimizing the risk of
future criminal behavior by others (deterrence).  And perhaps a fourth
would say the measure is designed to protect the offender from himself and
reform his behavior (rehabilitation).  A fifth person might say none of the
above, and instead articulate that the measure is designed to regulate risk
(preventative detention theories), which is typically labeled civil.
My own view is that given that many collateral consequences (especially
automatic ones) involve the deprivation of a good or the imposition of some
form of suffering against the will of the offender, due to past wrongdoing,
and are inflicted by the state, they belong in the punishment camp, or very
close to it.112  They also signal ongoing moral condemnation by sorting peo-
108 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 210–38 (1968); HERBERT L. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35–58, 62–71 (1968). See generally Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
109 See LaFollette, supra note 16, at 243 (describing how collateral consequences can be
classified as full-blown punishment, attendant consequences of criminal behavior, or pro-
tection measures).
110 See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution and the Secondary Aims of Punishment, 44 AM. J.
JURIS. 105, 105 (1999).
111 Simon, supra note 22, at 2139 (discussing sexual-predator civil-commitment laws as
incapacitation in practice).
112 This is undoubtedly truer for automatic collateral consequences than potential
ones.  This definition is not my own and builds from others. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt,
Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILE COURT—
RURAL CRIME 1282, 1282–83 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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ple into camps and perpetuating stigma.113  This is a position in line with
prior Supreme Court precedent and allowed by current precedent.114
But if collateral consequences are not criminal punishment because leg-
islative classification remains central to their definition, and merely regula-
tory measures (perhaps with punitive attributes) designed to minimize risk
and protect against the dangerous, the argument is subject to one minor
tweak.  Those measures are the logical outgrowth of the pursuit of utilitarian
purposes of punishment, but the legal system has conveniently classified
them as civil, regulatory measures in order to escape the direct consequences
for the administration of justice had they been classified as criminal punish-
ment by the courts.
In either instance, their relation to utilitarian punishment theory war-
rants examination because whereas determining whether collateral conse-
quences share retributive and utilitarian justifications might not be fully
possible, it can still hold, as a distributive matter, that they more easily pursue
utilitarian purposes.  In other words, collateral consequences could have
retributive and utilitarian justifications, making their classification as punish-
ment hard to decipher given that the doctrine conflates retributive with puni-
tive at times.  Nevertheless, it is still the case they more easily pursue
utilitarian purposes as a matter of distribution.  In this sense, the doctrinal
grayness could be interpreted this way: retributive distributive principles of
punishment could not fully support them so they had to be rationalized in
another way.115  Avoidance of the full restraining components of desert,
113 Christopher Bennett makes a similar argument when he labels collateral conse-
quences “supplementary harms.”  Christopher Bennett, Invisible Punishment Is Wrong—But
Why? The Normative Basis of Criticism of Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 56 HOW.
J. CRIME & JUST. 480, 484 (2017) (labeling collateral consequences punishment because
they are “a sanction that is intentionally imposed by the State as a way of causing a disability
or harm in response to some criminal behaviour, which is in some way supplementary to
the headline sentence and hence in some way hidden, yet which has a significant and
lasting detrimental impact on an offender’s life in society”); see also Robinson, supra note
19, at 206 (“Criminal liability signals moral condemnation of the offender, while civil liabil-
ity does not.”).  Collateral consequences communicate moral disapproval and, in the case
of potential collateral consequences, allow community members to act on that moral
disapproval.
114 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867) (“[E]xclusion from any of the
professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no
other light than as punishment for such conduct.”); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 286 (1867); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opin-
ion) (acknowledging “incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation” as possible
justifications for punishment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 273–74 (1980) (referenc-
ing “‘accessories’ included within the punishment”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
366–67 (1910).
115 Kaiser, supra note 4, at 358 (noting how the Supreme Court seemed hesitant to
classify collateral consequences as punishment given their nonretributive basis); Paul H.
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (2001) (“While increasingly designed to prevent dangerous per-
sons from committing future crimes, the system still alleges that it is doing criminal ‘jus-
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despite legislative desire otherwise, might underlie the persistence of the
criminal-civil distinction in this regard.  The next two Parts illustrate why col-
lateral consequences align with utilitarian purposes for punishment, labeled
that way or not by courts.
II. UTILITARIAN PURPOSES AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
On the surface, collateral consequences might seem retributive given
that passions for desert could support them, but they also reflect two differ-
ent social impulses: control through incapacitation and deterrence and the
maximization of social welfare.116  Both are the logical outgrowth of utilita-
rian approaches to punishment.  Jeremy Travis has argued harsh sentencing
over the past four decades has been criticized as the result of “tough on
crime” measures that amount to the reemergence of retribution in the form
of long periods of incarceration.117  But the indirect consequences associ-
ated with or after incarceration are primarily designed to protect the public,
categorize risky individuals, and prevent future crime.118  Stigmatization,
actuarial justice, and economic analyses of the administration of justice all
can be said to underlie collateral-consequences policy.119  And their unduly
harsh nature reflects traditional utilitarian cost calculations that seek high
returns in public safety for little cost.120
tice’ and imposing ‘punishment.’ . . . One can ‘restrain,’ ‘detain,’ or ‘incapacitate’ a
dangerous person, but one cannot logically ‘punish’ dangerousness.”).  If the alternative as
presented above is true, then fewer collateral consequences would be punishment, and
thereby retributive constraints would be applicable to fewer collateral consequences.
116 The implications of this point actually go beyond this Article.  For if the primary
feature of collateral consequences is that they are utilitarian, then no wonder determining
the difference between the criminal and the civil spheres is so difficult, or arguably mired
in tautology.
117 Travis, supra note 2, at 27; see also Simon, supra note 22, at 2140 (“Throughout the
1980s and 1990s retributive themes were combined with appeals to increase preventive
controls.”).
118 See Dolovich, supra note 20, at 98 (“The logic of this organizational system is simple:
those who are judged undesirable or otherwise unworthy lose their status as moral and
political subjects and are kept beyond the bounds of mainstream society.”); Ewald, supra
note 76, at 95 (“[M]any collateral sanctions are said to pursue classic regulatory aims,
reducing risk and protecting the public’s ‘health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment’ . . . .”).
119 See Ewald, supra note 76, at 80 (“Several core concerns of the criminological litera-
ture, such as the contemporary desire to denigrate and stigmatize offenders, the move
toward ‘actuarial justice,’ and the pervasive desire to reduce costs, do capture important
elements of American collateral sanctions policy.”).
120 See Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the
Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 321 (1984) (noting how the utilitarian model
“suggests that the balance between punishment and enforcement levels should be heavily
tilted toward punishment”).
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While modern-day access to previously unobtainable data has allowed
the impulse to control risk to take criminal justice by storm,121 the logic
behind collateral consequences was there first.  Antirecidivism measures, risk
assessments,122 big data collection of criminal record history information,123
and the explosion of probation and parole supervision124 are all manifesta-
tions of the same impulses pursued in policy.  These developments illustrate
the move toward public-safety-based rationales over the last half century.125
In the purest philosophical sense, collateral consequences preceded these
modern policy interventions as legislatively enacted, low-cost interventions
that incapacitated ex-offenders.126  They operated to prevent occasions for
crime by those judged to be risky by disallowing the risky (or dangerous)
from acting in certain arenas.  The judgment might not have been as scien-
tific, but legislatures were operating on philosophical cost-benefit analysis
121 See generally J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evi-
dence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1336–37 (2011) (noting the desire to sentence
“smarter”).
122 See Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Follow the Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment into Sentencing,
23 FED. SENT’G REP. 266, 266 (2011) (noting how risk-assessment tools merely put science
behind the judgments already made clinically by judges).  Actuarial risk assessment has
gained steam in a number of ways, including with an endorsement by the American Law
Institute and its enshrinement in the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6B.09 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017).  But some scholars have cautioned
against its widespread use, calling for critical inquiry. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 16, at
59–60; Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 490 (2018); John
Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 489, 505 (2016); Sidhu, supra note 18, at 702–04 (criticizing the disconnect
between actuarial risk assessment and punishment theories); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 817 (2014);
Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 21 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).  For an especially strong criticism of risk assessment, see
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN
ACTUARIAL AGE (2007) (lamenting how efficiency has replaced traditional theories of pun-
ishment as the first principle of criminal law).
123 See generally JAMES E. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015); Alessandro
Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J.
1 (2016).
124 See generally Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of
Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291 (2016); Michelle S. Phelps, Mass Probation: Toward a More
Robust Theory of State Variation in Punishment, 19 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 53 (2017).
125 WILLIAM R. KELLY WITH ROBERT PITMAN & WILLIAM STREUSAND, FROM RETRIBUTION
TO PUBLIC SAFETY: DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 176–77 (2017)
(emphasizing movement away from retributive principles toward antirecidivism measures);
Dolovich, supra note 20, at 100 (mentioning how recent scholarship shows that alleged
rehabilitative ideal during the latter half of twentieth century was actually contingent on
regional differences in approach); Robinson, supra note 115, at 1433–34 (describing how
rising crime after the 1950s led to prioritization of deterrence).
126 Dolovich, supra note 20, at 99 (noting how collateral consequences purposefully
burden newly released offenders, reflecting “society’s commitment to permanent exclusion
proves to reach beyond the prisons”); id. at 115 (“In the American context, however, far
from working to alleviate the burdens of reentry, the state instead exacerbates them.”).
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principles, using past crimes as a proxy for future dangerousness.127  Ex-
offenders were sorted into classes, which resulted in de facto incapacita-
tion.128  Collateral consequences allowed the risky to be monitored directly
or, at the very least, by a pervasive network of restrictions that restrict the
ability to “move” or cause damage in society.129  The fact that many collateral
consequences, enacted with long-term or lifetime bans, mirrored the rise in
mandatory, but judicially regulated sentencing, illustrates this point.130
Notably, reforms to the Model Penal Code that emphasized utilitarian
purposes for punishment, with only a limited role for retribution, occurred
around the same time.131  State legislatures added collateral consequences
while adopting the Model Penal Code, affirming support for utilitarian theo-
ries of punishment.  Some legislative efforts were thwarted by state courts in
the criminal context when courts sought to judicially reinject retributivist
principles into the state criminal codes.132  The same type of judicially driven
application of retributivist constraints did not occur with respect to collateral
consequences though, leaving them largely unrestrained and too popular to
resist.133
The other policy underlying collateral consequences is welfare max-
imization, which also rests on cost-benefit analysis.  The rise of collateral con-
sequences coincided with the rise of the social welfare state.  As the
opportunities and benefits afforded by the state grew, the social disruption
caused by an offender against the welfare state grew as well, which required
even more policies to stabilize the disruption.  Again, while this might sound
127 As Erin Collins has argued, this is exactly what actuarial risk assessment does.  Col-
lins, supra note 16, at 82 (“For parole purposes, actuarial risk assessment identifies recidi-
vism risk as a proxy for public safety risk.”).  Interestingly, certificates of relief as a remedy
for the negative effects of having a public criminal record seem to impliedly do the same
thing.
128 See Ewald, supra note 76, at 100.
129 See id. at 99–100 (“[R]ather than focusing on close and direct examination of a
unique person, actuarial justice tries to reduce risk by classifying people based on ‘virtual
identity stored in dossiers and databases.’” (quoting David Thacher, The Rise of Criminal
Background Screening in Rental Housing, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 26–27 (2008))).
130 See Dolovich, supra note 20, at 103–04 (noting how logic behind mandatory sentenc-
ing involved permanent moral judgment about the offender); id. at 119 (“[T]he collateral
consequences of felony convictions are frequently imposed across the board regardless of
the precise nature of the felony . . . .”).
131 See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1320 (2000) (referencing how
section 1.02 of the Model Penal Code omitted retribution).
132 See id. at 1319.
133 As Cotton illustrates, state legislatures clearly chose utilitarian theories of punish-
ment when adopting the Model Penal Code.  But pushback from courts suggests the rele-
vance of retribution, something both Paul Robinson and Dan Markel have written about
extensively.  This Article attempts to advance the conversation further, noting the rele-
vance of retributivism to collateral-consequences regimes.
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like some modern forms of retributivism,134 it is actually social tinkering to
ensure that the offender’s advantage does not have ripple effects on law-abid-
ing citizens.135  Like in ancient times, two camps were created, justified by
past criminal activity, to properly allocate resources.  Unsurprisingly, hyperac-
tive policing, followed by a movement for efficient policing, has coincided
with a rise in collateral consequences.136
The philosophical underpinnings of these policies stem from utilitarian
purposes of punishment.  As Jeremy Bentham put forth, the primary purpose
of punishment is crime prevention to maximize public safety.137  Bentham’s
concern was maximizing happiness for the community by reducing crime.138
Prescriptions built on consequentialist understandings of welfare follow, pur-
portedly justifying deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  There is
no limiting principle, other than the internal calculations of pleasure and
pain, to prevent against widespread instrumentalization of offenders.139
Punishment is justifiable as long as it can be shown that more good will come
than harm from the punishing.140  Criminal sanctions are contingent on
social utility.141  And this should be accomplished by minimizing the quantity
of costs to result in efficient administration of the system.142  The most well-
known purposes are deterrence and incapacitation.  Rehabilitative and com-
municative purposes also have utilitarian roots, although they are less con-
nected to collateral consequences.143  It is perhaps ironic that collateral
consequences are named as such given their consequentialist roots.  For they
134 See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 478 (1968) (unfair-
benefits theory).
135 See Travis, supra note 2, at 19 (“The principal new form of social exclusion has been
to deny offenders the benefits of the welfare state.”).
136 See generally Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761 (2012).
137 See JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
365, 396 (photo. reprint 1962) (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) (“Gen-
eral prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment, as it is its real justification.”).
138 See Tonry, supra note 21, at 128 (describing Bentham as concerned with maximizing
happiness for the community by reducing mischief and crime).
139 See Kleinfeld, supra note 93, at 1015 (“Instrumental rationalism has no source of
constraint, no counterbalancing force, except better instrumentalism, which is unreliable,
especially in particular cases.  The principle of instrumental punishment with respect to
the worst offenders is ‘more, cheaper.’”).
140 See PACKER, supra note 108, at 39 (“Its premise is that punishment, as an infliction of
pain, is unjustifiable unless it can be shown that more good is likely to result from inflicting
than from withholding it.”).
141 See Sidhu, supra note 18, at 678.
142 Seidman, supra note 120, at 320 (“[U]tilitarians have begun with the premise that
the criminal justice system should minimize the sum of the costs of crime and crime
prevention.”).
143 A common philosophical criticism of rehabilitation is whether it is rehabilitation for
the defendant’s or the community’s sake.  In the sense that collateral consequences frustrate
reentry, it might be argued that time-based collateral restrictions are designed to allow the
defendant to rehabilitate himself for the community’s sake.
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relate directly to utilitarian purposes of punishment and a superficial imposi-
tion of desert-based theories.144
The utilitarian justifies punishment by pointing to its effects: deterring
others and the defendant, reformation of the defendant, and its overall
reduction of crime, manifested in heightened safety, fewer crimes, and over-
all cost savings to authorities.  Those are goods to be pursued by punishment.
As such, punishment is entirely instrumental, pointing toward the prevention
or reduction of future crime, which is perceived as a greater evil than the
punishment itself.145  Bentham admitted that the immediate “end of punish-
ment [was] to control action.”146
Deterrence aims to prevent future crimes by signaling how crime results
in severe punishment.  The idea is that punishment—whether actual or sim-
ply threatened—will prevent others and the person being punished from
committing crimes.147  It presumes rational actors who “weigh the qualities
and probabilities of punishment before acting.”148  The hope is that either
threatened or real punishment will inhibit future actors from committing
crimes.149  It operates according to the following principle: the value of the
sanction must be greater than the apparent value of the pleasure that might
be obtained by the offender.150  In practice, this means that punishments
should be severer for more serious crimes to induce, at worst, offenders to
commit less severe crimes.  Those punishments should be heightened if the
probability of detection is low.151  Harsh sentencing regimes for crimes that
are not easily detectable (e.g., possession of controlled substances) can
result.152
This means that deterrence has two sides: specific and general deter-
rence.  Specific deterrence aims to prevent future crimes by a particular
offender or type of offender.  General deterrence optimistically takes aim at
the general population.  The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on the
would-be offender’s knowledge of the potential sanction, ability to calculate
the probability of detection, and to weigh the severity of the potential sanc-
144 See Robinson, supra note 115, at 1432.
145 See PACKER, supra note 108, at 39.
146 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 170 n.1 (Clarendon Press 1907) (1789) (referring to control for “reformation,” for
“disablement,” or for “example”).
147 See id.
148 Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Para-
dox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 181 (2008).
149 See PACKER, supra note 108, at 39; Fagan & Meares, supra note 148, at 175.
150 See BENTHAM, supra note 137, at 396 (“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of
[the] pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he
expects to be the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing
it.”).
151 See Tonry, supra note 21, at 128.
152 See Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, ATLAN-
TIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-
the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983/.
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tion.153  It also hinges on informal, social actors to help with the control.154
Actors will refrain from engaging in crimes after calculating that doing so will
result in a bad outcome or, to use traditional philosophical language,
pain.155  Although the psychological underpinnings of deterrence have been
studied at length,156 resolution does not matter for this Article.  Whether
deterrence theory presumes a rational or impulsive actor, or some other cal-
culation on the part of the would-be criminal,157 the intervention is designed
to control behavior (autonomous or not) to minimize the possibility of
future crime.158  As such, the law is designed to steer outcomes based on
whatever the human condition is.
Deterrence has been criticized on several grounds.  A common knock
against deterrence is that it is ineffective due to underreporting of crime.159
More foundationally, there are epistemic issues relating to utilitarian thought
that undermine the ability to truly know the effect of deterrent measures.  In
particular, should calculations of pleasure and pain account for objective or
subjective notions of pleasure?160  Additionally, many measures lack the abil-
ity to compare with a counterfactual.  For example, while recidivism rates
may say something about specific deterrence, with only incomplete data show-
ing what crime rates would be like without the measure, it is impossible to
know the broader efficacy of the measure.161  Further, discretion within the
American criminal justice system makes calculating the probability of punish-
ment difficult, which could require severe penalties to maximize deter-
rence.162  It also could lead to the off-loading of punishment to private actors
in the form of collateral consequences.163  That sounds familiar.164
153 See Fagan & Meares, supra note 148, at 181.
154 See id. at 182.
155 See PACKER, supra note 108, at 40.
156 See id. (describing how deterrence has been criticized for assuming rational, rather
than impulsive, actors).
157 See id. at 42 (“[I]t is not only Bentham’s rational hedonists who are touched by the
power of deterrence, but all those who are sufficiently socialized to feel guilty about break-
ing social rules and whose experience has led them to associate feelings of guilt with forms
of punishment.”).
158 See id. at 44 (describing how the criminal law reinforces social stigma, such that its
deterrence value relates to shame and fitness).
159 Robinson & Darley, supra note 108, at 458–60.
160 Id. at 455.
161 PACKER, supra note 108, at 39–40; see also Fagan & Meares, supra note 148, at 181–82
(“[M]odern deterrence research has failed to find consistent evidence of the deterrent
effects of punishment.  Empirical evidence . . . remains speculative and inconclusive . . . .”).
Professors Fagan and Meares make a forceful argument that informal sources of social
control are necessary to make deterrence fully effective and that the decline of such forces
is one reason why deterrence has been less successful than originally intended. See generally
id.
162 Robinson & Darley, supra note 108, at 463.
163 See generally Douglas Husak, Does the State Have a Monopoly to Punish Crime?, in THE
NEW PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 97 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds. 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 27 28-FEB-20 11:30
2020] are  collateral  consequences  deserved? 1057
Incapacitation is a justification for punishment that responds to predict-
ing dangerousness.  Its obsession is ensuring public safety through the pre-
vention of reoffending.165  Professor Herbert Packer called it the dark
underside of rehabilitation.166  It rests on the “prediction that a person who
commits a certain kind of crime is likely to commit either more crimes of the
same sort or other crimes of other sorts.”167  Like rehabilitation, it is
offender-centric.  Incapacitative logic underlies many collateral conse-
quences that restrict the ability of offenders to work in certain fields, join
certain professions, or enter certain physical spaces.  The offender has shown
her cards and, as a dangerous individual, might play them again, in the same
fashion.168  Never mind that the predictive models are less than stellar.169
What results is what Professor Gabriel Chin has referred to as punishment
based on one’s status as being labeled dangerous.170
That is why incapacitation is currently the topic of much debate in the
bail and sentencing contexts, as scholars are trying to devise ways to accu-
rately predict dangerousness.171  Doing so would in theory mitigate status
harms that currently touch too many people.  Similar arguments could apply
to those trying to determine who is worthy of rehabilitation.  However, previ-
ous efforts at refining prediction models have not been very good.172  High
false-positive rates run counter to the idea that the innocent should not be
punished, not to mention punished preemptively.173  The potential effect of
such models on exacerbating racial disparities already present within the sys-
tem is particularly distressing.174  Perhaps most importantly, incapacitation
based on prediction could remove blameworthiness from the equation
entirely because it would seem to be most justified for those with the least
amount of control.175  Put another way, incapacitation and rehabilitation
164 See Stuntz, supra note 21 (discussing how constitutional law provides subsidies for
severe punishment).
165 See Dolovich, supra note 19, at 271–72; Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation, 66
S.M.U. L. REV. 189, 197 (2013).
166 PACKER, supra note 108, at 55.
167 Id. at 49.
168 Id. (“Incapacitation . . . is a mode of punishment that uses the fact that a person has
committed a crime of a particular sort as the basis for assessing his personality and then
predicting that he will commit further crimes of that sort.”).
169 Id. (“It is an empirical question in every case whether the prediction is a valid
one.”).
170 See generally Chin, supra note 36.
171 See generally, e.g., Collins, supra note 16.
172 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 108, at 465–66.
173 See id. at 466 (“Among those who look to incapacitation as a panacea for what they
see as crime out of control, this is likely to lead to a dynamic in which, seeking to avoid
letting out of prison those who offend again, we increasingly move to assign incapacitative
sentences to those for whom the prediction of dangerousness is weaker and weaker, a fact
that arouses concerns for justice in many who think about the issue.”).
174 See Collins, supra note 16, at 106; Sidhu, supra note 18, at 709; Sandra G. Mayson,
Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019).
175 See PACKER, supra note 108, at 51.
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seem to result in state actions that lead to questions about encroaching
autonomy beyond reasonable limits because the focal point of the measure is
what is best for everyone but the offender.  And it is not clear that constraints
can be found in the penal theories underlying the measures in the first
place,176 in existing legal doctrine,177 or in policy given risk aversion
amongst decisionmakers.178
The motivation behind some collateral consequences indicates the link
to public-welfare concerns.  Although they came about in the “tough on
crime” era, which has retributive connotations, arguments behind the laws
also emphasized incapacitation and deterrence given the social benefits that
would be lost by the offender.179  When enacting prohibitions on federal
benefits for drug felons, Senator Phil Gramm stated: “[I]f we are serious
about our drug laws, we ought not to give people welfare benefits who are
violating [the] nation’s drug laws.”180  Intervention to take away an otherwise
existing benefit will cause individuals thinking about offending to refrain
from offending.  Even if the law rests on impulse-driven deterrence theory,
the premise is simply modified so that it reflects that the loss of benefits will
result in greater pain than the use of drugs.  In either instance, the draconian
antidrug collateral consequences are supported by deterrence theory.181
Licensing restrictions on the ability of ex-offenders to enter a profession
might be conceived of the same way, as well as in line with incapacitation.
States bar violent criminals from becoming barbers because scissors could be
a weapon, or from working in nursing homes because vulnerable patients
could be especially hurt.  Nurses cannot have drug convictions because they
might abuse patients or themselves when handling drugs.  Drivers with too
many DUIs, or other criminal, vehicular offenses, lose the ability to drive in
order to hopefully prevent future accidents.  All of these measures signal to
would-be offenders that the consequences of wrongdoing are stark.
176 See id. at 57–58 (“I am impelled to ask whether a theory of punishment that requires
acquiescence in compelled personality change can ever be squared with long-cherished
ideals of human autonomy.”).
177 See Corda, supra note 48, at 82 (noting how not one civil regulation has been struck
down under the Mendoza-Martinez factors).
178 GABE MYTHEN, UNDERSTANDING THE RISK SOCIETY: CRIME, SECURITY AND JUSTICE
52–57 (2014).
179 See LaFollette, supra note 16, at 248 (“These collateral consequences were adopted
in the mid 1990s as on instantiation of the ‘get tough’ approach to crime that emerged in
the 1970s.  The most common argument for these penalties was that they would deter
people from committing drug crimes.” (footnote omitted)).
180 Id. (quoting Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing—Denial of
Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 37, 42)
181 However, there is significant empirical evidence to suggest that this theory has not
been validated. See id. at 249 (discussing how drug crimes increased after collateral conse-
quences were increased).  Of course, whether offenders are aware of these consequences
prior to deciding to commit crimes could undermine the value of such empirical evidence.
But after almost twenty-five years, the word has gotten out.
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Further, they are designed in response to perceived risk of future behav-
ior that will cause harm, using convictions or even arrests as proxies for riski-
ness.  This has led some to classify them as risk-prevention regulations rather
than punishment.  But it is misleading to refer to these restrictions as exclu-
sively “addressed to the offender’s future behaviour.”182  That is because
assessments about risk of future behavior, by using a conviction as a proxy for
dangerousness, are by definition inextricably linked to past behavior.  These
measures might be justified as specific and general deterrents, combined
with other justifications.  The barber, facing the prospect of losing his cov-
eted license, will not physically act on his rage, which resembles specific
deterrence in action.  General deterrence causes the barbers in training to
refrain as well.  But if she does act out, the collateral consequence is justified
by incapacitation, as the offender has shown her hand: that she cannot be
trusted not to cause harm in the future.183  Hence, licensing restrictions
relate to deterrence and incapacitation premises.
Other collateral consequences with deterrence- and incapacitation-
based roots relate to political participation or the forfeiture of constitutional
rights: felon disenfranchisement and the ability to judge one’s peers by serv-
ing on a jury.  These measures effectively strip rights possessed exclusively by
citizens.  Felon disenfranchisement laws do just that: they signal that some
acts are so serious that they warrant the forfeiture of rights associated with
citizenship.  While retributive concerns could certainly motivate such a mea-
sure, the utilitarian motivation goes like this: think twice before committing a
felony that will take away the ability to vote.  The utilitarian policy, in action,
more easily results in permanent disenfranchisement because once the
offender is labeled dangerous, or in need of incapacitation, any length for
the ban is justifiable.  The thought of being governed by a system without a
say, where one cannot judge one’s peers, should make the would-be offender
think again.  In a liberal society that views citizenship as the vehicle to privi-
leges, the measure is designed to deter, and is justified by incapacitation as
the felon has shown that he cannot be trusted to participate in self-
governance.184
The authority to enact such measures comes from the belief that the
state has an obligation to protect the public from future harm.185  The state
makes a judgment about which types of crimes and harms it would like to
prevent and which types of offenders it would like to impair moving for-
182 Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A
Suggested Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 608 (1997).
183 See Dolovich, supra note 20, at 115–16 (describing how bans on public housing,
education, employment, and access to benefits inhibit reintegration in order to further
exclusion).
184 See Travis, supra note 2, at 19 (“[T]hese punishments have become instruments of
‘social exclusion’ . . . , a distancing between ‘us’ and ‘them.’” (footnote omitted)).
185 See LaFollette, supra note 16, at 253.
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ward.186  It also makes a judgment about the utility of such interventions,
which may be cause for criticism in its own right, given the empirical research
showing that some interventions have criminogenic effects.187  Nevertheless,
this is where deterrence and incapacitation drive collateral-consequences pol-
icy.  The state ultimately decides to restrict membership in a profession, the
ability to obtain a license, or the power to freely move in and out of social
institutions, to a smaller class of people.188  The threat of intervention into
family situations is designed to prevent domestic harm.  The state is effec-
tively communicating that committing this crime results in suffering.  This
signaling by the state operates to deter, and the restriction itself operates to
mitigate risk by incapacitating offenders.189  Both punishment purposes aim
to maximize welfare and minimize harm.  Collateral consequences are logi-
cally connected to utilitarian punishment theory, albeit conveniently classi-
fied under a different name.190  The language of welfare maximization, also
claimed by regulation, allows for the confusion.
But the roots are deep, which explains why the range of collateral conse-
quences has increased significantly.191  There are upward of forty thousand
different collateral consequences nationwide, with an explosion of enactments
from over the past half century.192  Professors Katherine Beckett and Steve
Herbert have shown how the state marks people and excludes them from
186 See Dolovich, supra note 19, at 271–72 (“To understand what motivates the Ameri-
can impulse to respond to all but the most minor infractions with prison, we must look to
another theory of punishment that has taken center stage in recent years: the theory of
incapacitation, according to which ‘offenders are imprisoned . . . to restrain them physi-
cally’ . . . .  The concern is with possible future dangerousness . . . . [T]o punish with social
exclusion makes perfect sense.” (first omission in original) (quoting FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
& GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 3 (1995))).
187 Deterrence certainly has epistemic issues that need to be resolved, especially in partic-
ular issues: Can it be conclusively shown that such preventative collateral consequences are
warranted?  Are risk assessments to be trusted? See Collins, supra note 16, at 95–96 (detail-
ing studies questioning the utility of risk-assessment-based interventions, as well as their
criminogenic effects for low-risk offenders); Dolovich, supra note 20, at 117 (noting how
collateral consequences increase likelihood of reincarceration).
188 See Dolovich, supra note 19, at 274 (describing removing offending individuals from
the “shared public space”).
189 Dolovich, supra note 20, at 117 (noting how formal, postsentence impediments
“consign[ ] to social marginalization”); Travis, supra note 2, at 26 (“They also operate as a
form of selective incapacitation—for example, by keeping sex offenders away from certain
locations and keeping drug offenders away from public housing.”).
190 See Simon, supra note 22, at 2169 (“[A]t the same time retribution and deterrence
were being emphasized in raising sentences for crimes in the 1980s, purely incapacitative
measures like pretrial detention were also being instituted . . . .”).
191 See id. (“The rapid proliferation over the last quarter century of laws that link long,
and typically mandatory, incapacitative sentences to past felony convictions, in combina-
tion with otherwise legal activities (like being a felon in possession of a weapon) or rela-
tively minor crimes, gives prosecutors enormous discretion to eliminate individuals from
society in large numbers . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
192 See Collateral Consequences Inventory, supra note 39.
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physical spaces, creating “zones of exclusion.”193  Order-maintenance
offenses and civil restrictions, like low-level forms of trespass194 that prevent
movement into public spaces, are incapacitative.
This is the logical outgrowth of the new penology, which prioritizes tink-
ering to minimize the possibility of harm.195  In other words, once the state
prioritizes public-safety rationales for punishment as the driving force behind
interventions, there are endless opportunities because the lure of minimizing
harm through the control of rational decisionmaking or by treating impulses
breeds innumerable possible interventions.196  It is always the next collateral
consequence that will prevent future harm, either by deterring the rational
potential lawbreaker or restraining the impulsive.197  The law restricting
employment in the name of preventing violence is characteristic utilitarian-
based punishment.
Interestingly, even recent efforts to roll back collateral consequences
operate along the same lines, prioritizing the protection of public safety, or
pointing to studies showing that some consequences are criminogenic, to jus-
tify reform.198  Many of these reforms have followed the Collateral Conse-
quences in Occupational Licensing Act (CCOLA) model legislation, which
suggests licensure denials are only justifiable if predictions about future
behavior give rise to public-safety concerns.199  New Hampshire’s law allows
disqualification upon “public safety” grounds or if the petitioner has failed to
show she has been effectively rehabilitated.200  Laws in Indiana and Wiscon-
sin require evidence of rehabilitation;201 Kansas’s law references the general
welfare.202  All of these reforms operate along utilitarian cost-benefit calcula-
tion lines, emphasizing that licensing reform is necessary to limit recidi-
193 KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN
URBAN AMERICA 8, 14–16 (2010).
194 See Dolovich, supra note 20, at 118 (describing municipal ordinances designed to
restrict entry into public spaces).
195 Other scholars have made a similar argument, albeit in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Eaglin, supra note 165, at 194; Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 417, 425 (2009).
196 See Eaglin, supra note 165, at 197 (“Incapacitation removes offenders from society,
and the new penology approaches crime as something permanent and unpreventable.”);
Kleinfeld, supra note 93, at 1015 (referencing how instrumentalization has no constraints).
197 See Eaglin, supra note 165, at 198 (“The expansion of collateral consequences . . .
illustrate[s] the theory of total incapacitation.”); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at
137–41 (recognizing how collateral consequences relate to exclusion).
198 See Stephen Slivinski, Turning Shackles into Bootstraps: Why Occupational Licensing
Reform Is the Missing Piece of Criminal Justice Reform 4 (Ctr. for the Study of Econ. Liberty at
Ariz. St. Univ., Working Policy Report No. 2016-01, 2016) (presenting evidence that states
with restrictive occupational-licensing laws have higher rates of recidivism).
199 See Model Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act, INST. FOR JUST., https://
ij.org/activism/legislation/model-legislation/model-collateral-consequences-reduction-
act/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
200 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-G:13 (2019).
201 IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-26-4 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.335 (West 2018).
202 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-120 (West 2019).
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vism.203  More recently, the United States Commission on Civil Rights made
several recommendations, almost entirely on public-safety grounds.204
This endless possibility for adjustment through policy interventions is
endemic to utilitarian purposes for punishment given their own epistemic
shortcomings: a lack of concrete, agreeable metrics for pleasure and pain
(welfare or harm) and the inability to fully and conclusively determine risk
and distinguish it from dangerousness.205  It also frustrates the ability to
reform collateral consequences because the grounds for constraint are not
solid.  And as Professor Sharon Dolovich points out, this approach fails to
appreciate the connection between human complexity and criminal behav-
ior, resulting in overbroad exclusionary measures.206  Forty thousand collat-
eral consequences show the fruits.  Constraints are needed to rein in such
punishment.
The next Part turns to that task, pivoting to an unlikely source: retributi-
vism.  Although retributivism has been fairly criticized for its own epistemic
issues207 and is often conflated with punitive ends to connote harsher punish-
ment, it is worth engaging its built-in safeguards208 to see if they caution
against an expansive number of interventions in the form of collateral conse-
quences.  In doing so, it shifts the debate from whether collateral conse-
quences are useful to whether they are deserved.
III. RETRIBUTIVISM AS A CONSTRAINT
Instead of asking whether collateral consequences are useful, what
would happen if the question were whether they are deserved?  As men-
tioned, existing state codes already conceive retributivism as a constraint on
punishment.  Coupled with older judicial conceptions of collateral conse-
quences as punitive, and following scholarly developments over the past sev-
eral decades arguing that retributivism could help reduce disproportionate
sentencing, that reality suggests that the same argument might be applicable
to assessing the validity of collateral consequences.
But conceiving retributivism as a constraint first requires recognition
that there is no one theory of retribution and that some are in a better posi-
203 See Slivinski, supra note 198, at 4.
204 See Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Chair, U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, to Don-
ald J. Trump, President, U.S., Mike Pence, Vice President, U.S., and Nancy Pelosi, Speaker,
U.S. House of Representatives (June 13, 2019), in U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RIGHTS, supra note
4.
205 See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 108, at 463 (describing how based on cur-
rent statistics penalties based on deterrence would have to be severely inflated, which
would offend the moral sensibilities of the public).
206 Dolovich, supra note 19, at 294, 301 (“[W]hat might seem like overinclusivity and
thus unfair and gratuitous punishment is in fact sensible and judicious preemptive action
taken against people who, by their own criminal conduct, have already sufficiently demon-
strated the inherent danger they pose.” (footnote omitted)).
207 See generally Kolber, supra note 10.
208 By this I mean the distributive principles of punishment held by retributivist
theories.
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tion than others to undercut collateral consequences.209  Retributive theories
of justice have existed for millennia.  They are older than Western culture
and systems of law and are shared by philosophical thinkers from all parts of
the world.  In a sense, retributive theories represent an ongoing, perpetual
dialogue amongst some of the most well-known thinkers in history, including
Aristotle and other ancient philosophers, Jewish and Christian scholars,210
Kant, Rawls, legal philosophers like H.L.A. Hart,211 and others.212  In fact,
some have seen the constant reassessment of relevant moral considerations as
a great strength of retributivism.213  The twentieth century saw no shortage
of scholars thinking about the relevance of retribution to modern punish-
ment practices, including Professors Herbert Morris, Jeffrie Murphy, Andreas
von Hirsch, Antony Duff, John Finnis, and Michael Moore.214  More recently,
legal scholars focused on the viability of retribution in a liberal political
order.215
209 See Cottingham, supra note 15; Nigel Walker, Even More Varieties of Retribution, 74
PHILOSOPHY 595 (1999).
210 ANDREW SKOTNICKI, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 4 (2008) (“The
ideal end at which punishment aims is the liberation of the offender from all forms of
personal and social alienation, and a return to full participation within the community
without stigma or further repercussion for the culpable offense.”).  Professor Skotnicki
describes how Biblical teaching connects crime, law, and expiation, such that “once the
debt of justice has been paid, full restoration to the community is mandated.” Id. at 16
(citing Leviticus 5:20–26); see id. at 17 (citing Psalms 107:16).  He ultimately argues that
Catholic theory calls for the “reintegration of the offender” after retribution, with careful
attention to the “kind of environment [that] best creates the conditions for the affirmation
and inculcation of the virtues.” Id. at 27.  This notion of restorative retribution stems from
two conditions: the state’s moral obligation to punish and to cause individual and social
renewal for the offender. Id. at 37.
211 See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, 60 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y 1, 12 (1959), reprinted in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 108, at 1, 12
(referring to retribution as a principle of distributive justice that limits punishment).
212 See, e.g., HART, supra note 108, at 230–37; JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT
(1973); Max Atkinson, Justified and Deserved Punishments, 78 MIND 354 (1969); Sidney
Glendin, A Plausible Theory of Retribution, 5 J. VALUE INQUIRY 1 (1971); Donald Clark
Hodges, Punishment, 18 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 209 (1957); John Laird, The Justi-
fication of Punishment, 41 MONIST 352 (1931); C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punish-
ment, 3 TWENTIETH CENTURY, no. 3, 1949, at 5, reprinted in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 301
(Stanley E. Grupp ed. 1971); Herbert Morris, supra note 134; C.W.K. Mundle, Punishment
and Desert, 4 PHIL. Q. 216, 221 (1954); Lisa H. Perkins, Suggestion for a Theory of Punishment,
81 ETHICS 55 (1970).
213 See Markel, supra note 10, at 24 (“What is important to see is that retributive justice
is a contested concept, and may remain so in part because of its normativity and complex-
ity.”); Mary Sigler, Humility, Not Doubt: A Reply to Adam Kolber, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 158, 159.
214 Some scholars, such as Joshua Kleinfeld, label Murphy and Duff “reconstructivists.”
See Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1488, 1501 & n.40.
215 See, e.g., Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and
the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001); Markel,
supra note 10, at 24 (arguing that retributivism based on moral desert alone struggles to
provide normative justification for punishment within a liberal democracy).
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Retributivist ideas reemerged in response to concerns about democratic
legitimacy, equality, arbitrariness, and proportionality in sentencing
regimes.216  This coincided with the emergence of Rawlsian political theory
that articulated reciprocal obligations as central to political citizenship.217
Feinberg, Morris, and Duff, who are sometimes labeled reconstructivists,
then emphasized the communicative value of retributive punishment theory
in its ability to project the wrongfulness of crime and its effect on law-abiding
portions of the population.  Importantly, Morris and von Hirsch articulated a
theory of limited, or what might be called negative, retributivism to moderate
punishment.218  This followed H.L.A. Hart’s idea of retribution as a limiting
principle.219  Nevertheless, a disjunction persisted between these emphases
in the scholarly literature and overly severe, punitive sentencing policy, as
well as in the rise of collateral consequences.220
This Part does not purport to represent all of the nuances221 within
retributive theories; instead, it aims to point out key retributive premises, in
order to lay the groundwork for a retributive accounting of the existing col-
lateral-consequences regime.222  Those shared premises include recognition
that preserving individual and communal dignity is relevant to punishment,
that the purpose of punishment is the restoration of individual and commu-
nal equilibrium, that punishment should be contingent on desert and pro-
portional, and that the blameworthiness associated with the wrongful
behavior is extremely significant to whether and what type of punishment is
appropriate.  Underlying these premises is a robust recognition that human
beings are free and responsible agents in perpetual relationship with the
state.223  This Part engages these components of retributive theories,
216 See Tonry, supra note 21, at 122.
217 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
218 See Morris, supra note 212; Tonry, supra note 21, at 122–23.
219 See Hart, supra note 211, at 12.  Hart’s theory is not without its critics. See, e.g., John
Morison, Hart’s Excuses: Problems with a Compromise Theory of Punishment, in THE JURISPRU-
DENCE OF ORTHODOXY: QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY ESSAYS ON H.L.A. HART 117, 125–27 (Philip
Leith & Peter Ingram eds., 1988) (criticizing Hart for failing to recognize that restricting
punishment on the basis of desert assumes some amount of desert is justified on nonu-
tilitarian grounds).
220 See Stuntz, supra note 21, at 849–50 (noting rise of severe punishment following the
constitutional criminal procedure revolution); Tonry, supra note 21, at 123.  As mentioned
above, reformers between the 1970s and 1990s often conflated retributive themes with
incapacitative practice.
221 See Andrew Oldenquist, An Explanation of Retribution, 85 J. PHIL. 464, 474 (1988)
(labeling retributive justice as a “cluster concept”).
222 But this Article does argue that the shared premises almost certainly caution against
the existing collateral-consequences regime.
223 Markel, supra note 215, at 2194.  Markel’s project of justifying retribution in a lib-
eral, democratic order is noteworthy.  Although an in-depth treatment is beyond the scope
of this Article, the distinction between moral and political retributivism (more traditionally
labeled legal retributivism) is a significant one.  It is my position that either approach to
retributivism would view the existing collateral consequences regime skeptically, although
some versions of moral retributivism might do so more sharply given their serious concerns
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acknowledging the work of several prominent retributive theorists.  It sug-
gests retributivist skepticism of collateral consequences is warranted, con-
cluding a full-blown retributive accounting is necessary to develop how
retributive insights might benefit collateral-consequences reform.224
A. Responsibility and Blameworthiness
Retributive theory comes in many forms.  One admittedly crude division
might involve pre-Kantian and post-Kantian theories of retribution.  Some
scholars have distinguished theoretically and empirically between revenge-
based retribution from desert-based retribution.225  As Professor John Cot-
tingham noted, retributive theories entertain notions of repayment, desert,
the moral significance of blameworthiness, the role of satisfaction for the
community, fairness, and communication about wrongfulness.226  Professor
Nigel Walker astutely added to Cottingham’s classifications by recognizing
that some theories relate to rights whereas others prioritize duties.227
Retributive theories, as offender-centric, presume human responsibility
for human actions.228  Repayment theories aim to make offenders pay the
price for committing crimes.229  Desert theories inflict punishment because
it is deserved, although the relationship between desert and repayment is
complicated.230  Kantian thought pervades both, as well as the notion that
about calibrating blameworthiness to punishment. See infra notes 228–34.  However, older
versions of retributivism may go in different directions given certain political, moral, and
social premises. See, e.g., PETER KARL KORITANSKY, THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF PUNISHMENT 39–67 (2012) (critiquing modern theories of retributivism and explaining
how they are contingent on certain philosophical first principles not shared by all
retributivists).
224 The complete development of this theory can be found in a companion paper:
Brian M. Murray, Retributivist Reform of Collateral Consequences, 52 CONN. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2020).
225 See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976);
Monica M. Gerber & Jonathan Jackson, Retribution as Revenge and Retribution as Just Deserts,
26 SOC. JUST. RES. 61 (2013) (describing survey results indicating that community members
conceive of retribution as either an outlet for retaliation or a means to restoration, and
postulating the philosophical antecedents for both positions).
226 See Cottingham, supra note 15, at 238–45.  Interestingly, some of the attributes listed
by Cottingham seem to smuggle in utilitarian thinking.  Herbert Packer makes this point as
well, noting how satisfying the community’s desire for revenge in order to mitigate the
possibility of other, socially undesirable reactions is actually an argument from utility.
PACKER, supra note 108, at 37 (“[P]unishment is justifiable because it provides an orderly
outlet for emotions that, denied it, would express themselves in socially less acceptable
ways.”).  Of course, the type of retributivism at issue, and whether it comprehends a role
for cabining emotional responses to crime, is crucial to Packer’s observation.
227 See Walker, supra note 209, at 604.
228 See PACKER, supra note 108, at 37; Markel, supra note 215, at 2194.
229 See Cottingham, supra note 15, at 238.
230 Id. at 239.
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mere violation of a law justifies punishment.231  Modern thinkers such as
Michael Moore, building on earlier notions of retribution, emphasized how
retribution imposes upper limits on punishment by focusing on moral
desert.232  This came to be known as negative retributivism.  Guilt is a neces-
sary condition for punishment, meaning it “is permissible but not obligatory
to punish the guilty, and only the guilty.”233  The corollary is that punishing
those who do not deserve to be punished is morally impermissible.234  This is
why modern theories are often referred to as deontological, although there
are teleological theories of retributivism.
These ideas suggest that retributive theory would hold that a punish-
ment regime has to account for human dignity and should refrain from the
instrumentalization of persons.  This relates directly to preventive restraints
whether classified as criminal punishment or not by courts.235  Second, a
proper concern for blameworthiness, and innocence, is in order.  And third,
while consequentialist theories might be utilized in order to craft precise
sentences, they cannot be overinclusive.236  Utilitarian purposes might be uti-
lized for crafting specific punishment so long as the justification for punishment
overall is retributive, reflecting a precise blameworthiness calculation mani-
fested by distributive limits (or a ceiling for punishment).237  Whereas retri-
bution justifies, other theories might be called upon to specify the
punishment within that justification.  In short, when it comes to collateral
consequences, making the first question whether they are deserved alters the
rest of the analysis.
The above concepts naturally flow into two very well-known components
of retributive theories of punishment: the idea that punishment should be
proportionate to the crime238 and account for blameworthiness.239  For
many retributivists, intentional, or at least knowing, wrongdoing is a precon-
231 Id. at 240 (“[T]he breaking of a law is, in itself, a sufficient condition for just
punishment.”).
232 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND
THE EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view that pun-
ishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it.” (emphasis omitted)).
233 Walker, supra note 209, at 601 (referencing Cottingham).
234 See Michael S. Moore, A Tale of Two Theories, 28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 27, 31 (2009);
Moore, supra note 232, at 179 (“Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the
moral culpability of those who receive it.” (emphasis omitted)).
235 Markel, supra note 10, at 12 n.28 (noting how Duff criticized the criminalization of
dangerousness).
236 Emad H. Atiq, What Unconditional Credence in Individual Desert Claims Does Retributiv-
ism Require?, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 138, 139 (“[T]he retributivist will only pursue future
crime prevention subject to a strict moral side constraint: the good consequences cannot
be purchased at the cost of punishing those who do not deserve it.”).
237 Koritansky, supra note 15, at 334 (“[T]he goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and
the protection of society are morally significant goals of punishment just as retribution is,
even if retribution is the primary goal that gives punishment its defining character.”).
238 Bradley, supra note 110, at 118 (noting how the punishment could be “limited to
the disturbance created by this or that discrete criminal act”); Robinson & Darley, supra
note 108, at 492.
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dition for punishment.  Some measure of moral blameworthiness is required,
and some crimes require this more than others.  More importantly, the com-
mission of crimes occurs along a spectrum of voluntariness.  So punishment
should be calibrated to how much the will of the offender actually usurped
the baseline situation of equality that was previously undisturbed.240  This
inquiry requires a proper appreciation for context, including the social and
political backdrop.  Because retribution leaves room for reasonable quanti-
ties of punishment, and accepts the pursuit of secondary aims of punish-
ment, the theory contains generational flexibility.241
Put simply, an offender’s blameworthiness, situated against the broader
social situation, matters for both justifying punishment and the nature of the
sanction.242  As Dan Markel noted, “[a]ny commitment to fairness or propor-
tionality in matters of punishment requires a broader understanding of two
things: first, what the magnitude or size of a wrong is; second, how the desira-
bility of addressing that wrong compares against other social needs in terms
of pervasiveness, urgency, or cost.”243  In other words, retribution, as a social
practice responding to antisocial behavior, must be cognizant of other justice
concerns in other social contexts, and the political commitments of a demo-
cratic order.244  Moral retributivists would focus on prepolitical wrongdoing
instantiated in law when categorizing blameworthiness.  But however desert is
conceived, it is a significant limiting principle.  Additionally, accounting for
gradations of blameworthiness might leave room for mercy in conjunction
with the administration of justice.245  Without getting too far ahead, lifelong
prohibitions or liberty constraints would probably be viewed skeptically for
almost all but the most disruptive crimes.
239 Tonry, supra note 21, at 128 (“There are many different kinds of retributive theory,
but they share the view that moral blameworthiness is an important consideration in deter-
mining just punishments.”).
240 Koritansky, supra note 15, at 335 (“Some crimes, however, are committed less volun-
tarily than others, and thus involve less of an overindulgence of the will.  Under this princi-
ple . . . the law can impose more lenient penalties for crimes committed less voluntarily
(and therefore less culpably).”).
241 Markel, supra note 215, at 2206 (“Retribution does not claim that the features of a
fitting punishment are absolutely consistent across time and place. . . .  An obligation to
punish neither entails nor specifies a code of sentencing that is impervious to the varia-
tions across history and culture.”).
242 Koritansky points out how Aquinas avoids the Kantian problem of the lex talionis by
appreciating mens rea and how it might inform punishment.  Kant was only concerned
with external acts.  Koritansky, supra note 15, at 334.
243 Markel, supra note 215, at 2213.
244 Id. at 2207 (“Once we consider punishment as a social practice, we have to consider
it ex ante, as one attractive practice among others.  Once viewed as a social institution
responding to a social problem, retributivism must consider the social cost dimension of
the wrong and then calibrate the severity of the response.”).
245 While the relationship between mercy and justice is a complicated one and certainly
beyond the scope of this Article, it is at least worth flagging.  By this sentence I mean to
imply that focusing on blameworthiness rather than the external act justifying punishment
might leave room for lenient treatment otherwise not considered.
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Concerns about proportionality and blameworthiness also overlap with
the constraint built into retribution that avoids instrumentalization of human
beings for other ends.  Because ex-offenders maintain moral status despite
past wrongdoing, using their example to advance a goal other than restora-
tion of equilibrium is problematic.246  This marks the most important foun-
dational distinction between retributive and utilitarian theories of
punishment and suggests that collateral consequences that aim first to pre-
vent risk are problematic under a retributivist account.
A few examples illustrate some of these points.  Consider a young male
convicted of possession of marijuana.  His conviction might result in denials
relating to public benefits, such as food stamps or health insurance, or pre-
vent him from obtaining a loan for community college.  Government or pri-
vate employers might refrain from hiring on that basis.  Whereas the
utilitarian could conceivably justify such measures as part of an overall cost-
benefit analysis, the retributivist must immediately ask whether such mea-
sures go beyond the desert calibrated for the offense itself.  This necessarily
involves an assessment of the offender’s blameworthiness, which calls for a
probing analysis.  The retributivist also must ask whether the measure is pro-
portionate, especially in light of an already inflicted direct sentence.  But the
proportionality question is asked relative to desert, not utility.
Of course, the discussion becomes more difficult with a more severe
offense.  But even with consideration of a felony—say larceny of significant
amount of property or money—the retributivist begins from a starting point
of constraint, whereas the utilitarian asks a fundamentally different question.
The legislator concerned with incapacitation or deterrence asks: Will what we
do with this person help others even if it hurts this person?  The retributivist
asks: Did this person receive the appropriate amount of punishment based
on what he or she deserved?  Whereas both questions might provoke a range
of answers, and can potentially justify almost any measure, the latter suggests
more caution because it focuses more on the thing done than what can be
achieved.  It might even be said that the retributivist—again operating from
the assumption that a direct sentence has already been inflicted—starts from
a position of skepticism, even if she could be persuaded that the collateral
consequence in question should be conceived as part of the necessary desert.
B. Retribution, Dignity, Community, and Liberty
As mentioned above, retributive theories understand themselves to be
dignity protecting.247  Kant argued forcefully against using human beings as
means to an end.  Earlier thinkers emphasized individual and community
246 Atiq, supra note 236, at 143 (“A key animating principle behind retributivism is the
idea that the certain forms of conduct involve objectionable instrumentalization of per-
sons.  Individuals with moral status should not be used as mere means.” (capitalization
altered)).
247 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1985, at 3, 5 (“Only a theory of punishment built on these values,
so a common argument goes, will respect persons as individuals of special worth—a worth
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dignity claims underlying retribution.248  Human beings, both individually
and by virtue of being in community, share claim to certain goods that are
intrinsically valuable, such that a disruption that results in a pilfering of those
goods necessitates punishment in order to recapture and restore dignity
across the board.249  This basic principle has been developed by moral, legal,
and political retributivists.250
Thus, punishment implicates the maintenance of the political situation
inherent to human existence and specific to a political regime.251  Jeffrie
Murphy said as much, noting retributive theories take stock of how the politi-
cal and social equality between citizens that is disrupted by a wrongdoer justi-
fies punishment.252  While this first principle has its critics,253 it underlies
that is compromised if we feel free to use persons . . . simply as resources for the common
good.”); Lewis, supra note 212.
248 John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 99 (1999)
(“The debts from which just punishment liberates the offender are not debts to the victims
who might be plaintiffs in a civil proceeding or might understandably but wrongly desire
revenge.  Rather, we may say, those debts are the advantage—the inequality—which, in the
willing of an offense, is wrongly gained relative to all the offender’s fellows in the community
against whose law, and so whose common good, the offense offends: the advantage of
freedom from external constraints in choosing and acting.” (footnotes omitted)); Murphy,
supra note 247, at 6–7.
249 Finnis, supra note 248, at 96 (“The intrinsic worth of what truly benefits me has the
same worth in the lives of any other persons who do or could share in that kind of benefit.
This truth and our primary understanding of it are the primary source of all human com-
munity, more decisive than any emotion of sympathy or subrational instinct of solidarity.”);
Murphy, supra note 247, at 6–7.
250 Markel, supra note 215, at 2191–2205 (discussing how his “Confrontational Concep-
tion of Retribution” treats human beings as moral agents who must be reprimanded by the
state for claiming relational, legal, and political superiority); Markel, supra note 10, at 1
(“[O]nce we understand the basis for our presumptive political obligations within liberal
democracies, a more capacious approach to establishing criminal laws can be tolerated
from a political retributivist perspective.” (emphasis omitted)).
251 This is the case whether one conceives of retributivism as built on moral or political
desert.  Markel, supra note 10, at 35 (“Comprehensive retributivists share a common view:
they point to the moral wrongs that create a basis for the wrongdoer’s just deserts.  By
contrast, political retributivists like myself point to the offense against a liberal legal order
as grounds for punishment by the state.”).  The moral retributivists assume an inherent
moral-political relationship.  Moore, supra note 234, at 45 (criticizing legal retributivism).
The political retributivists focus on the relationship between the “polity and the criminal.”
Markel, supra note 10, at 29. Political retributivism is a particular, qualified strand of older,
Kantian legal retributivism, and focuses on the moral logic developed from the political situa-
tion. Id. at 30 (noting how political or legal retributivists differ in their focuses on relation-
ship between offender and the state); id. at 36–37 (conceding that legal retributivism is
connected to morality, albeit one that is “distinctly political, institutional, and relational,”
and then describing how these moral values grow out of the liberal system).
252 Murphy, supra note 247, at 6–7.
253 Flanders, supra note 10, at 156–57 (“The retributivist sees a continuity between our
personal relations and our legal ones, with the legal system in a way mirroring our personal
attitudes of praise and blame, and institutionalizing them. . . . [W]hat I want to say is that
the retributivist is right about our personal lives, but wrong about our legal ones.  The legal
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several retributive theories of punishment, despite later differences.  Retribu-
tion, at root, is a response to disruption of order,254 whether that disruption
is understood as a credit taken by the offender that needs to be paid back,255
a matter of desert, or the mere act of wrongdoing, and whether classified as
an offense against preinstitutional morality or legal-political institutional
relationships.256
In fairness, some scholars have argued this social restorative component
is different from desert-based punishment, instead referring to it as recon-
structive.257  Reconstructivists suggest that retributivism is wholly offender-
centric, whereas reconstructivism contemplates the social aspects of punish-
ment, focusing on the reconstruction of the violated normative order.
Reconstructive theorists distinguish this theory from retributivism, claiming
that the latter is wholly deontological and focused on desert, whereas the
“lodestar” for the reconstructivist is solidarity.258  Accordingly, the criminal
law defends moral culture because it is “shared,” not simply because it is
“right.”  For purposes of the argument here, the distinction might not matter
given that reconstructivism shares some traits with deontological-based
retributivism, and even more with predeontological retributivism, meaning
system shouldn’t be viewed as an institutionalization of our attitudes about praise and
blame.  The legal system should be about public safety . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).  But
personal relations have a de facto legal component because when one acts personally, that
action may or may not violate legal rules or occur in a nonlegal space, which of course has
legal implications.  People are, by definition, in political-legal relationships that overlap
with the personal, whether perceived by the persons in relationship or not.  Markel makes
a similar point when locating retributive values in the liberal democratic order.  Markel,
supra note 215, at 2196 (“Retribution . . . effectuates equal liberty.”).
254 PACKER, supra note 108, at 38 (recognizing reconciliation with the social order as
the concern of the retributivist).
255 Morris, supra note 134, at 478; Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State’s Interest in Retribution, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283, 289–90 (1994) (“According to Morris, the criminal is a freer-
ider on a mutually beneficial scheme of social cooperation and must be punished to annul
the excess unfair advantage his wrongful failure to exercise self-restraint has given him over
those citizens who have been law-abiding.”).
256 Markel, supra note 215, at 2198 (“The retributive encounter thus connects the crim-
inal with the purpose of affirming equal treatment under law; it cannot therefore be
claimed that the good of retribution is uncertain or external in character.”); Markel, supra
note 10, at 5 (noting how retribution is built on a belief in moral accountability, equal
liberty under the law, and the obligations of the state in response to wrongdoing); Murphy,
supra note 247, at 3 (“Retributive theorists claim that punishment makes sure that wrong-
doers suffer in proportion to their moral iniquity and thereby give up any unfair advantage
over others their wrongdoing may have won them.”).  Markel allows for state punishment
when the crime is created through and “consistent with liberal democratic institutions.”
Markel, supra note 10, at 25.
257 Kleinfeld, supra note 25, at 1488–90 (referring to how criminal law relates to the
shared ethical life, and the restitching of that fabric).  My understanding of reconstructiv-
ism is that it contemplates the social function of the criminal law as restoration of the social
fabric that was violated by the offender, the motivation being the shared moral culture
underlying the criminal law.
258 Id. at 1492.
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teleological or virtue-oriented retributivism that situates offenders in a cul-
tural community.  The latter leaves more room for communal restoration,
recognizing it as a byproduct of individual punishment because the mainte-
nance of just equality is the objective due to shared individual dignity.259  In
short, the noninstrumentalizing social components of both would view collat-
eral consequences with suspicion.  For the retributivist, the pursuit of just
equality does the social work, and for the reconstructivist, it is done through
the recognition of the link between criminal law and moral solidarity.
It is important to realize here that a significant distinction within theo-
ries of retribution will ultimately have a bearing on how one views a collat-
eral-consequences regime.  For some pre-Bentham thinkers, punishment was
not conceived of as pain.  The abovementioned principles contemplate pun-
ishment as correction of an individual will gone rogue rather than pure
harsh treatment.260  This has important implications for modern critiques of
retributivism, which focus at times on how they result in unduly harsh sanc-
tions.  If punishment is wholly conceived of as pain, rather than primarily the
rectification of an indulgence of the will, then retribution seems less forward
looking.  Older versions of retributivism, as well as Markel’s political retributi-
vism,261 conceive punishment as inherently responsive to a will that was “fol-
lowed . . .  excessively,”262 thereby understanding punishment as inherently
restorative rather than just punishment for punishment’s sake.263  Again, as
Murphy has articulated at length, the foundational root of retributive theory
is the notion of individual and communal order.
As such, it might be said that some retributive theories possess inher-
ently forward-looking components, despite their caricature as always back-
ward looking.  This is for two reasons: (1) they seek to restore the disruption,
259 Koritansky, supra note 15, at 332.  Retributivism has restorative components, includ-
ing a social one, given that it is response to a violation of the shared moral order.  This is
why some retributivists refer to the “order of just equality.”  Finnis, supra note 248, at 98.
Equality is a social term.  For a modern take on this, see Markel, supra note 215, at 2193
(noting how “retribution for unlawful wrongdoing is internally justifiable because it . . .
achieves certain goods”).
260 Finnis, supra note 248, at 98 (noting how for Aquinas the essence of punishment is
that it “subject[s] offenders to something contrary to their wills” (emphasis omitted)).
261 See Markel, supra notes 10, 215.
262 Finnis, supra note 248, at 98 (quoting ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II-
II, q. 108, a. 4c).
263 Id. at 98–99 (“Hence the proposition foundational for Aquinas’ entire account of
punishment: the order of just equality in relation to the offender is restored—offenders
are brought back into that equality—precisely by the ‘subtraction’ effected in a corre-
sponding, proportionate suppression of the will which took for itself too much (too much free-
dom or autonomy, we may say).” (footnotes omitted)).  This is why an earlier retributivism
would be confused by the language of paying back debts.  Instead, punishment would
involve the offender returning a credit, whether that was due to a claim of moral or politi-
cal superiority. See Markel, supra note 215, at 2193 (“[R]etribution for unlawful wrongdo-
ing is internally justifiable because it . . . achieves certain goods.”).  This distinction also
shows up empirically in the work of Professors Monica Gerber and Jonathan Jackson. See
Gerber & Jackson, supra note 225, at 62 (noting two dimensions to retribution).
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both individually264 and communally,265 and (2) they allow for the usage of
utilitarian thinking when crafting specific sentences, albeit tempered by
other important principles built from retributive premises.266  But at root,
retributivism strives to reinforce foundational dignity and autonomy by mod-
erating social, political, and legal relations.267  Again, this is where some the-
ories of retributivism and reconstructivism overlap; the communicative268
and postincarceration implications allow for constraints.
Retribution has traditionally justified imprisonment because the taking
of liberty corresponds directly to the usurpation taken by the offender at the
time of wrongdoing.  It’s a liberty-for-liberty trade.  Imprisonment paradoxi-
cally—so the argument went—restored through suppression of the will for a
temporary period of time.269  Professor Herbert Morris articulated this when
describing the point of punishment as the restoration of equality between the
wrongdoer and those who obey the laws.270  Punishment, under the right
conditions, legitimizes a state of equalized liberty under the law.271  Of
course, this leads to additional questions: how to determine the quantity of
264 Koritansky, supra note 15, at 326 (“[P]unishment . . . is an essentially retributive
measure taken to restore justice by inflicting something contrary to the will of a criminal.”
(emphasis added)).
265 Murphy, supra note 247, at 6–7.  Retributivists that draw largely on pre-Kantian
thought to justify punishment acknowledge the restorative nature of retributive theory.
John Finnis notes how “punishment has a medicinal value; as far as possible it should
contribute to the correction of the offender.”  Finnis, supra note 248, at 97 (quoting CATE-
CHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 2266 (2d ed. 1997)).  Further, by healing the disrup-
tion, it is medicine for the community. Id.  In fact, this might be construed as value added,
contra utilitarian theories of punishment, which only focus on prevention and do nothing
with respect to restoration of the social imbalance.  It also contrasts with Morris’s unfair-
advantages theory, which begs the question of whether the criminal has obtained an advan-
tage when committing a crime or not. See KORITANSKY, supra note 223, at 148.
266 See generally Robinson & Darley, The Utility of Desert, supra note 108.
267 Markel, supra note 215, at 2205 (“For to do nothing in the face of unlawful wrongs
grants plausibility to the claim by offenders of unequal liberty under law, leaves a lie about
the moral reality of our social world uncorrected, and, by permitting the tyrannical usurpa-
tion of public decision making by rogue individuals, doing nothing causes the state to
breach its quasi-contractual obligation to protect that order of decision making.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
268 See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001); R.A.
Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1
(1996); Markel, supra note 10, at 26 (“An account like mine is fairly described as a form of
communicative retributivism.”).
269 Finnis, supra note 248, at 98–99 (“Hence the proposition foundational for Aquinas’
entire account of punishment: the order of just equality in relation to the offender is
restored—offenders are brought back into that equality—precisely by the ‘subtraction’
effected in a corresponding, proportionate suppression of the will which took for itself too
much (too much freedom or autonomy, we may say).” (footnotes omitted)).
270 GEORGE SHER, DESERT 77 (1987); Morris, supra note 134, at 475–501.  Morris’s
understanding of retributivism is not without critics, who accuse him of confusing retribu-
tion with rectifying free riding.  Markel, supra note 10, at 32–34.
271 Markel, supra note 10, at 27.
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liberty that should be lost to accomplish this restorative function, and
whether incarceration should be the method of deprivation.  These are ques-
tions Murphy spent considerable time on, and they require further explora-
tion vis-a`-vis specific collateral consequences that might come on the heels of
a direct sentence.272  Some retributivists would answer via in-depth examina-
tions of blameworthiness, whereas others would follow Morris’s lead and
attempt to calibrate for advantages and disadvantages.273  Furthermore, res-
toration must be understood in both individual and social terms, so that the
reform of the offender is not presumed to occur with incarceration.274
But assuming that the liberty calibration question could be answered
well (something most retributive theories do not purport to guarantee, but
only some entertain humility about), once equality is restored, the ex-
offender and fellow citizens would be on equal footing, such that any addi-
tional punishment would be inappropriate.  Extra punishment would actually
be disruptive and overcorrective after the baseline equilibrium was restored.
The enhancement of safety by the proposed intervention would only matter
to the retributivist as a secondary matter, but not at the expense of the
requirements of justice and its constraints.275
The purportedly restorative components of retributive theory, some-
times reflected in modern negative retributivism, are designed to account for
the popular passions for revenge, retaliation, or other negative actions by the
community.276  They also respond to the divergence in attitudes amongst citi-
zens about what justifies punishment, reflected in the sex-offender examples
above.  Judge Richard Posner made this point persuasively when undertaking
an economic analysis of retribution as a theory of punishment: “While retri-
bution focuses on the criminal’s wrong, retaliation focuses on the impulse of
272 See generally Murphy, supra note 255. This is a relevant point when thinking about
the expansiveness of the collateral-consequences regime.  It is possible that collateral conse-
quences could operate as a disadvantage that aims toward the restoration talked about
above.  But if liberty is taken away first through incarceration, or some other liberty
restraining measure (like probation), are collateral consequences (especially those that are
automatic) always extra punishment?
273 See KORITANSKY, supra note 223, at 165.
274 As Professor Skotnicki demonstrates in his book, while incarceration was initially
conceived as medicinal and penitential, the results have not always followed. See
SKOTNICKI, supra note 210.
275 Starr, supra note 122, at 818 (noting how risk prediction is not relevant to the core
retributive perspective). But see Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account,
87 TEX. L. REV. 571, 577 (2009) (making a retributivist case for enhancement statutes).
276 Finnis, supra note 248, at 102 (“Retributive punishment . . . is thus remote indeed
from revenge.  Punishment cannot be imposed by the victim as such.  Indeed, it cannot
rightly be imposed on behalf of the victim as such, but only on behalf of the community of
citizens willing to abide by the law.”).  The pre- and post-Kantian split is most stark on this
point.  Whereas Kant struggled with the notion of the lex talionis, and has been rightly
criticized for its potential savagery, early retributivist thinkers foreshadowed the idea that
retribution contains limiting principles on punishment.  Koritansky, supra note 15, at 329
(“[Punishment] does not long for the suffering of the criminal for its own sake, but for the
equality of justice that will be restored by that suffering.”).
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the victim . . . to strike back at the criminal.”277  The dignity components of
retributive theory are designed to counteract communal indiscretion and
overreach.  This is why retribution is not revenge.  It is also why retribution is
not primarily a crime control strategy.  The first goal is desert-based restora-
tion, born from return of a credit inappropriately gained by the offender,
and taken back by the community through proper authority.  The means to
that restoration varies depending on the retributivist theory, but anything
excessive should be viewed skeptically.  Hence retribution, while first exer-
cised to deny “the offender’s claim of superiority,” also by definition leaves
room for the offender’s transformation.278  Collateral consequences arguably
leave little room for an offender’s transformation, and as shown above, con-
trol a lot of people.
In fact, retribution can caution a measure of humility when it comes to
precise sanctions.279  Put another way: retributive theory is about justifying
punishment, but once the punishment is justified, the same principles justify-
ing retribution as the dominant theory leave room for reasonable choices
regarding interventions.280  Some of this is due to moral uncertainty and dif-
ficulty and complexity associated with blameworthiness.281  Professor Paul
Robinson developed this in his work, and other scholars have sought to jus-
tify it by constructing mixed theories of punishment.282  Negative retributiv-
ism, emphasizing upper limits on such measures, is operating in the same
space.283  And Robinson’s work shows that opening the question to demo-
cratic deliberation is not necessarily sure to result in harsher situations for
277 Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71,
72 (1980) (analyzing social functionality of retribution from an economics lens).
278 Markel, supra note 215, at 2210.
279 Sigler, supra note 213, at 162 (noting that because retribution is based on certain
moral claims, without one hundred percent certainty, it “entails humility”).
280 Koritansky, supra note 15, at 335 (“What criminals deserve, in other words, is deter-
mined by estimating the seriousness of the criminal act and is realized by imposing a corre-
spondingly serious penalty within the parameters of a reasonable determination of what
will place the criminal back upon equal terms with the rest of the law abiding citizenry.”).
Some modern critics of retribution might be surprised by the idea that a strong proponent
of retributivism, like John Finnis, leaves room for reasonable decisionmaking regarding
the precise nature of sentences.  Of course, Finnis is operating from a rich jurisprudential
tradition that recognizes “determinatio” in the legal system.  Finnis’s theory of retribution
has deep epistemological and ethical origins, recognizing the primacy of reason over will,
so reason must determine how the will should be punished in a reasonable fashion.
281 Atiq, supra note 236, at 140.
282 Robinson & Darley, supra note 108, at 491 (“[O]nce judges ensure that the total
amount of punishment is the amount deserved, they are free to select a sanctioning
method that will maximize rehabilitation or incapacitation (or deterrence or any other
worthwhile crime reduction strategy) without fear that their selection of method may
endanger the criminal law’s moral credibility.”); Tonry, supra note 21, at 131 (discussing
“mixed theories” of punishment that set boundaries).
283 Tonry, supra note 21, at 122–23 (analyzing Norval Morris’s work).
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offenders.  Recent studies suggest it might depend on whether the predicate
offense was violent or not.284
In short, retributivism asks whether collateral consequences reflect a
proper understanding of the desert basis, deep questions about the role of
blameworthiness and proportionality, and how a measure will calibrate to an
offender’s relationship to the community over the long term.  It is not prima-
rily concerned with their usefulness, which can beg for intervention after
intervention.  The road to long-term bans of employment, licenses, and other
aspects of life in the community contains more off-ramps when desert writes
the directions.  These constraints suggest room for viewing collateral conse-
quences skeptically, whereas utilitarian thinking prioritizes other objectives,
losing the individual offender in the process.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted a two-fold argument: (1) that collateral conse-
quences should be understood as closely associated with utilitarian purposes
of punishment and are in desperate need of constraints; and (2) that retribu-
tivist theories may view an expansive collateral-consequences regime with
great skepticism and therefore offer desired limitations.  The indirect conse-
quences of contact with the criminal system—whether through an arrest or
conviction—represent, for the most part, deterrence or incapacitation in
action.  Legislative labeling and judicial classification for functional reasons
has rendered potential constitutional protections for offenders inapplicable.
Ironically, collateral consequences are the collateral effects of utilitarian pun-
ishment logic meeting practicality and functionality concerns, resulting in
punishment seeping into the civil system.
In contrast, the core premises of many retributive theories suggest skep-
ticism about an expansive regime of collateral consequences.  In particular,
the link between blameworthiness and punishment, notions of proportional-
ity, restoration, and the social and political relationships underlying concep-
tions of retributive justice suggest caution.  The retributivist should be
concerned that many consequences operate as extra punishment or harm
that disrupts the order restored after formal punishment.  The crux of it is
this: collateral consequences let criminal justice go farther than the retribu-
tivist should like.  Because viewing collateral consequences through a retribu-
tivist lens—by asking whether they are deserved rather than useful—leads to
concern, reformers of collateral consequences, officials involved in the
administration of justice, and public participants should consider how a
retributivist lens could provide sturdy ground for protecting the dignity of ex-
offenders and furthering community restoration after the imposition of
direct punishment.
With that said, more work remains to be done, addressing a number of
questions: (1) When, if at all, should a collateral consequence be understood
284 See, e.g., Michael O’Hear & Darren Wheelock, Violent Crime and Punitiveness: An
Empirical Study of Public Opinion, 103 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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as extra punishment?  (2) What are the duties of the state and private parties
if a collateral consequence is extra punishment?  (3) Does the phase during
which the collateral consequence comes about matter for purposes of state
involvement?  (4) What are the roles of the prosecutor, and other officials in
the administration of justice, given this reality?  (5) Are there implications for
criminal procedure rights for defendants?  (6) Are there constitutional con-
straints that may align with retributivist concerns, or is this primarily a matter
for the legislature?
These questions warrant a full retributivist accounting of collateral con-
sequences to explore the possible advantages of applying retributivism as a
constraint to the network of collateral consequences.285
285 These questions are taken up in the second paper of this project, titled Retributivist
Reform of Collateral Consequences, which is forthcoming in volume 52 of the Connecticut Law
Review.
